An essay by John Morton concerning Gilles Deleuze and Photography

part one - text
Photography Paces Philosophy Pedagogic  
by John Morton.

Introduction

“If the three ages of the concept are the encyclopedia, pedagogy, and commercial professional training, only the second can safeguard us from falling from the heights of the first into the disaster of the third - an absolute disaster for thought whatever its benefits might be, of course, from the viewpoint of universal capitalism.”


The question before us concerns the nature of photography in general; but our specific concern here is how photography might be conceptualized within a post-structural context. This is not a simple question; and to find an adequate answer, we will have to first contend with certain pronouncements regarding the nature of photography. To do this, we must examine the assumptions which underwrite those pronouncements; and only then will we be able to proceed, in a properly post-structural manner, toward reconstructing our understanding of how photography might best be conceived in post-structural terms.

In the course of critiquing ideology across all of its occurrences, post-structuralists have often found themselves confronting interpretive tendencies that objectify, even spatialize, processes which are inherently temporal in nature.

At first glance, photography seems to provide textbook examples of those reifying processes which have attracted so much critical analysis from throughout the field of post-structural philosophy. Photography, it appears, does little more than turn whatever it encounters into an immobilized object. What little is left of ‘being’ for that which is photographed seems entirely stripped of any ‘becoming’ which would situate such subjects within the temporal nature of their reality. Yet even when this is obviously so, it may still be the case that there are some grounds for viewing photography in another light:

“When we define the Photograph as a motionless image, this does not mean only that the figures it represents do not move; it means they do not emerge, do not leave: they are anesthetised and fastened down, like butterflies. Yet once there is a punctum, a blind field is created (is divided)...”

“The presence (the dynamics) of this blind field is, I believe, what distinguishes the erotic photograph from the pornographic photograph. Pornography ordinarily represents the sexual organs, making them into a motionless object (a fetish), flattened like an idol that does not leave its niche; for me, there is no punctum in the pornographic image; at most it amuses me (and even then, boredom quickly follows). The erotic photograph, on the contrary, (and this is its very condition), does not make the sexual organs into a central object; it may very well not show them at all; it takes the spectator outside its frame, and it is there that I animate this photograph and that it animates me. The punctum, then, is a kind of subtle beyond - as if the image launched desire beyond what it permits us to see...”

Roland Barthes, “Camera Lucida”; pages 57... 59.

> Figure 01-1a: Scene and Not Seen <
Even though The Photograph can strip its subjects of that temporal dynamic which is the essential nature of their ‘becoming’; even when The Photograph objectifies the experiential reality of those whose images it captures, the possibility remains that there may be more to photography than initially meets the eye. We must consider the possibility that there are as yet unrealized dynamics that inform the medium of photography, and which we might yet hope to discover anew.

Barthes’ observation that certain photographs are capable of producing a ‘blind field’ immediately suggests that there is something inherent within photography which carries a certain predisposition toward the conceptual. It remains to be seen if this ‘something’ tends toward pedagogic insights, or ‘commercial professional training’: this is something we shall have to determine for ourselves.

Barthes states that the creation of such a ‘blind field’ can often be traced back to the occurrence of what he terms a photographic punctum. In describing this concept of a punctum, Barthes states:

“In this habitually unary space, occasionally (but alas all too rarely) a “detail” attracts me. I feel that its mere presence changes my reading, that I am looking at a new photograph, marked in my eyes with a higher value. This “detail” is the punctum.”

Roland Barthes, “Camera Lucida”; page 42

> Figure 01-2a: Consuming Her <

The first question we should bear in mind, then, is the nature of such ‘details’ in relation to the habitually unary space that they arise within. If what has been assessed as the static nature of the photograph can be attributed to the unary nature of such a space, then the concept of the punctum provides us with our first clue as to how photography might be capable of tracing lines of escape that cut across such reifying tendencies.

The ideal of a unary space is well defined in the history of philosophy, where it is a basic conceptual parameter for structuralist thought. If we are to discover how the photographic punctum could indicate the way toward a post-structuralist understanding of photography, we should first consider how post-structural philosophy came to supersede structuralism. In this way, we can establish a post-structural methodology for determining how photography can be redefined in post-structural terms, as determined through an analysis of the photographic punctum.

If I wanted to find a defining moment in the emergence of post-structuralist thought, I would probably be inclined to start by looking in “Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry: An Introduction,” by Jacques Derrida. And within this text, I would be very interested in one particular footnote:

“[note 141: Access to the origin of sensible ideality, a product of the imagination, would also require, then, a direct thematization of the imagination as such. Now the latter, whose operative role is nevertheless so decisive, never seems to have been sufficiently inquired into by Husserl. It retains an ambiguous status: a derived and founded reproductive ability on the one hand, it is, on the other, the manifestation of a radical theoretical freedom. It especially makes the exemplariness of the fact emerge and hands over the sense of the fact outside of the factuality of the fact. Presented in the Crisis as a faculty that is homogenous with sensibility, it simultaneously uproots morphological ideality from pure sensible reality.

“It is by beginning with the direct thematization of imagination in its situation as an original lived
experience (utilizing imagination as the operative instrument of all eidetics), by freely describing the phenomenological conditions for fiction, therefore for the phenomenological method, that Sartre's breakthrough has so profoundly unbalanced - and then overthrown - the landscape of Husserl's phenomenology and abandoned its horizon."


> Figure 01-3a: A Safe Community <

The text that Derrida here alludes to is Jean Paul Sartre’s “The Imaginary: A phenomenological psychology of the imagination.” First published in 1940, this systematically brilliant analysis by Sartre of both physical and mental images clearly demonstrates that the imagination is in itself a distinct form of consciousness, and as such is quite different from sensibility.

Since Husserl’s phenomenological method was based upon the technique of ‘imaginary variation’; and, since Husserl sought to fully explore the sense of certainty seemingly established by Descartes’ “Cogito Ergo Sum” (I think, therefore, I am), Sartre's accomplishment in distinguishing the imaginary as distinct from the sensory was a decisive critique of Husserl's phenomenology - despite the fact that Sartre himself accepted Descartes’ certitude as unquestionable:

“It is necessary to repeat here what has been known since Descartes: a reflective consciousness delivers us absolute certain data; someone who, in an act of reflection, becomes conscious of ‘having an image’ cannot be mistaken... If these consciousnesses are immediately distinguishable from all others, it is because they present themselves to reflection with certain marks, certain characteristics that immediately determined the judgment ‘I have an image’. The act of reflection therefore has an immediately certain content that I will call the essence of the image.”


More importantly, Sartre’s insights underwrite a subsequent shift within Continental philosophy, which has moved away from a transcendental tradition of idealism and toward a more empirical, contingent, and fact-based analysis of “what is called thinking.” Within this conceptual shift into a post-structural approach to philosophy, we will need to consider whether photography is more adequately characterized in terms of perception, with reference to the mechanical nature of its ability to capture images; or in terms of a phenomenological approach which describes the encounter between The Photograph and imaging consciousness.

> Figure 01-3b: Walk Don’t Run <

Barthes’ insight regarding the production of a ‘blind field’ by way of the photographic punctum already suggests that photography can support the conceptual formations which characterize imaging consciousness; but we will need to clarify exactly how this is so.
If we are to truly grasp how a post-structuralist approach to philosophic inquiry might apply to photography, we would do well to briefly consider the basic methodology at the heart of Husserl's phenomenology: that of ‘imaginary variation.’ In particular, we need to understand how this basic phenomenological technique came to be superseded by a properly post-structural form of analysis.

**Imaginary Variation**

In deploying the technique of ‘imaginary variation’ within phenomenology, Husserl sought simply to consider possible variations for any given conceptual theme; and then, to extract any commonalities within such variations as ‘the essence of the conceptual theme being considered.’ The end result can certainly be considered as a ‘unary space’; so in determining how this approach was critiqued by Sartre, we should be able to gather a few clues as to the nature of the photographic *punctum*.

Undeniably, Husserl’s approach gives an unqualified precedent and priority to the analytic processes of consciousness, over and above the evidential encounters of the senses. And yet, Husserl proceeds under the assumption that sensory veracity establishes a precedent of truth for the imaging processes of consciousness.

Here we clearly see how a methodology for ‘defining the object of inquiry’ proceeds without duly considering that the process of objectification might itself demand a certain requisite analysis. This is an altogether typical approach when the general concept of ‘objects,’ as they seem to appear before the senses, is taken as characteristic for all forms of certainty. It is in successfully separating that sensory certainty of the object from the conscious production of its image that Sartre begins to open the encompassing universality of ‘ideals’ in philosophic structure to the singularity of any specific concept’s productive contingency.

Our goal here will be to determine if and how photographic processes are distinguishable from those basic sensory parameters of vision upon which they are modeled. Thus, it remains to be seen just where photography might find itself after such a decisive split between sensory perception and imaging consciousness. Indeed, the conceptual parameters which might define photography seem to have simply dropped into a yawning gulf that opened between the sensory presuppositions of a predominantly idealist approach toward defining conceptual structures, and the depth of those directions in analytic inquiry which began to appear following Sartre’s work in establishing an existentialist approach to philosophy.

> Figure 01-4a: This Is NOT Post Structuralism <

To this end, we shall see just how far post-structural philosophy has distanced itself from Husserl’s phenomenology when we consider the emphasis Gilles Deleuze places upon Francis Bacon’s efforts to ‘paint just the facts,’ to capture where ‘the sense of the fact emerges outside of the factuality of the fact’; and yet, we will at the same time again encounter a technique very similar to ‘imaginary variation’ at the heart of Deleuze’s philosophic project. For, whatever limits Sartre may have defined as appropriate to that analytic methodology, it is certain that Husserl was firmly convinced of its philosophic validity:

“To determine this sense is, for Husserl, so little a question of “begin[ning] by understanding all lived experiences,” of abandoning or limiting the technique of imaginary variation, that the latter is explicitly and frequently prescribed in the *Origin*, a writing that can be considered one of Husserl’s last. For him, this technique remains the “method” according to which we obtain “a universal and also fixed *a priori* of the historical world which is always originally genuine”.”

“Farther on, he says: “we also have, and know that we have, the capacity of complete freedom to
transform, in thought and phantasy, our human historical existence... And precisely in this activity of free variation, and in running through the conceivable possibilities for the life-world, there arises, with apodictic self-evidence, an essentially general set of elements going through all the variants... Thereby we have removed every bond to the factually valid historical world and have regarded this world itself merely as one of the conceptual possibilities”.


That such certainty might arise of thought itself is a seductive ideal. Indeed, for a time there were many great thinkers who were enamoured of Husserl’s phenomenology; such as Jean Paul Sartre, to name but one. Phenomenology continued to influence the critical thinkers who followed after Sartre; such as Roland Barthes, to name another. Ultimately, though, the influence phenomenology held over the sciences and humanities proved untenable; and in the final analysis, it was revealed to be logocentric; Eurocentric; and ideological in the unwarranted assumptions of objectivity that defined the very core of its existence.

In a way, we must say that the ideal of universality informs the technique of ‘imaginary variation’ by providing a reflective sense of certainty to knowledge which had previously been assumed solely on the grounds of hegemonic belief systems. By the time that phenomenology had been developed, the absolute authority of “the word” (understood as revelatory in religious texts) had been supplanted by a paradigm of certainty derived of any sensory encounter with a physical object; and this in turn been taken as definitive for conceptual structures originating through imaging consciousness. Universality thus provided the justification for certainty: literally, that ‘one thing was being said’ across every instance of a particular occurrence provided the dominant model for veracity.

As it turns out, though, many things were always being said, everywhere; and universality was eventually revealed to be simply a way of listening for (and to) the same thing over and over, to the exclusion of everything else. The ‘unary space’ that phenomenology sought to establish proved to be illusory.

In the final analysis, even the most valued form of universality - that of human rights - turned out to be entirely contingent: upon specific struggles wherein specific groups attained specific rights at a singular cost to the individuals most directly involved. Such rights could always be abrogated in specific instances, whereby specific vested interests might find advantage in circumventing the rights of others: and in such circumstances, the loudest proclamations of universal rights only serve to drown out those dissenting voices who are forced to insist that they have no such experience of sharing in any universality of rights.

> Figure 01-5a: Brothers In Peace <

Thus we see how the critique of ideology reveals that the search for social and cultural ‘universals’ had been prescribed by a philosophic idealism which determined, in advance, what such universals would be; but, without ever establishing the actual conditions guaranteeing their existence. This is the context in which the strongest critiques of structuralism arose; and this is where the critique of photography as reifying and objectifying originates.

In establishing through phenomenology which (and how) actual examples would be emphasized in the course of this search for humanist ‘universals,’ the technique of ‘imaginary variation’ in fact simply instituted various modern Western European values and conventions as the measure by which the rest of the world, in all of its history, would be assessed and interpreted.
“The ambiguity of an example which is at once an undistinguished sample and a teleological model is still found here. In the first sense, in fact, we could say with Husserl that every community is in history, that historicity is the essential horizon of humanity, insofar as there is no humanity without sociality and culture. From this perspective, any society at all, European, archaic, or some other, can serve as an example in an eidetic recognition. But on the other hand, Europe has the privilege of being the good example, for it incarnates in its purity the Telos of all historicity: universality, omnitemporality, infinite traditionality, and so forth; by investigating the sense of the pure and infinite possibility of historicity, Europe has awakened history to its own proper end.”


That particular approach, as a search for universal structures to be found in all forms of social and cultural organization, became a dominant trend throughout the social sciences; and as such, became widely identified as “structuralism.”

> Figures 01-6a and 6b: Divergent Viewpoints <

Subsequently, we find post-structural philosophers such as Jacques Derrida considering fully the implications of those differences that Husserl methodically excluded from the conceptual essences he sought to define by using the phenomenological technique of ‘imaginary variation.’ With Derrida, we are compelled to consider how concepts stretch and break apart when they are forced into becoming something new; with Derrida, it is the texture of the differences in which each concept is enmeshed that uniquely defines its existence.

With this in mind, we shall be paying particular attention to the differential textures which attend the concepts we will be aligning in the course of our inquiry. We are not concerned here with a representational model that seeks to equate concepts as if assigning significations; rather, we wish to consider closely the texture of differential elements that Husserl’s technique of imaginary variation would have excluded and discarded. This approach will require the inclusion of rather long quotations within the body of this text; but, this cannot be avoided: after all, we have no right to assume that everyone interested in this topic will have the kind of philosophic background which would constitute a ‘unary space’ of referential experience.

So: if a trace of Husserl’s technique of imaginary variation can be found within the humanist sciences (and within anthropology in particular) as “structuralism”; then, the post-structuralist revolution can be said to have started from within Sartre’s writings. If we wish to determine how and where photography might fit into the array of post-structural concepts, then we would do well to consider how those images we know as photographs were conceived of in the writings of Sartre. And as it turns out, Sartre’s 1940 masterpiece “The Imaginary” is an excellent place to look for indications of how photography might be capable of escaping that essentially structuralist determination of being ‘reifying’ and ‘objectifying’ in nature. We shall be considering that work of Sartre’s at great length during the course of this inquiry; but first, we should consider in detail the nature of those objections raised against photography from within a post-structuralist context.

The Critique of Photography

Skipping quickly forward a few philosophic decades, we find that the critique of a properly Husserlian idealism spread throughout what we now identify as structuralist thought, to inform an entire post-structuralist approach to analytic inquiry.
Within the arts, the critique of ideology emerged most strongly in the form of a counter response to representation; in terms of Sartre’s work, we would have to say that an emphasis placed upon production by philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze replaced a Sartrean analysis of thought undertaken in terms of a Cartesian ‘reflection of, on, and by consciousness.’

As Michel Foucault noted, from that point forward philosophy began to concern itself with a very different kind of question; which is:

“To what extent the task of thought thinking its own history can liberate thought from what it thinks in silence and enable it to think differently.”


If there is one defining characteristic linking structuralism and ideology, it is that both tend to recognize the same allegedly objective identities over and over in the course of any analysis they undertake. New thoughts, new ways of thinking rarely form there unless forced to do so by the irrepressible insistence of unavoidable contingencies. Instead, we repeatedly encounter the same structural elements being repeated as ‘objective identities,’ which are taken as representative of universal ideals.

> Figure 01-7a: A Window On Structuralism <

It is within this context that we find the critique of photography beginning to form, and being defined primarily in terms of representation. Deleuze captures the nature of that critique quite succinctly when he states:

“Too many people mistake a photograph for a work of art, a plagiarism for an audacity, a parody for a laugh, or worse yet, a miserable stroke of inspiration for a creation. But great painters know that it is not enough to mutilate, maul, or parody the cliché in order to obtain a true laugh, a true deformation.”

Gilles Deleuze, “The Logic of Sensation”; page 89.

> Figure 01-7b: Wintergreen; What’s In A Name? <

Thus we see that The Photograph, despite its pretensions to the contrary, does not even begin to qualify as a work of art in Deleuze’s eyes. This is of course understandable when one considers the emphasis which Deleuze placed upon creation, and production, throughout the course of his philosophic career. It would not be inappropriate to consider that such a conception of philosophic productivity is in a very real way an active rebuttal of the endless repetitions which rule over idealist philosophies, determined as they are by essentially representational processes. It should come as no surprise, then, that Deleuze would consider photography to be of little interest to philosophy since, after all, resemblance and representation entirely determine the essential nature of The Photograph:

“Resemblance is the producer when the relations between the elements of one thing pass directly into the elements of another thing, which then becomes the image of the first - for example, the photograph, which captures relations of light. The fact that these relations play within a margin of error great enough for the image to present significant differences from the original object does not negate the fact that these differences are attained by a loose resemblance,
sometimes decomposed in its operation, sometimes transformed in its result. In this case, analogy is figurative, and resemblance remains primary in principle. The photograph can rarely escape this limit, despite all its ambitions.”

Gilles Deleuze, “The Logic of Sensation”; page 115.

In this view, photography is entirely dependent upon processes which are defined by resemblance; and because of this, photography must be considered representational in nature. The extent to which photography leaves resemblance and representation behind is the degree to which it ceases being photography. It seems entirely futile to try and find an alternative realization for photography in any direction that leads irrevocably away from resemblance.

> Figure 01-8a: Direct Resemblance <

The distinction established by Sartre between perceptual consciousness and imaging consciousness has widened here to the point where photography, grouped together with the sensory certitudes of perceptual consciousness, has been excluded from the productive realm of imaging consciousness. Photography is not seen to be capable of embodying those processes which actively support thought’s production of itself.

In truth, the outlook for photography from a post-structural perspective is bleaker still. Barthes notes the detrimental effect that the commercial popularization of photography has had upon other visual arts:

“The other means of taming the Photograph is to generalize, to gregarize, banalize it until it is no longer confronted by any image in relation to which it can mark itself, assert its special character, its scandal, its madness. This is what is happening in our society, where the Photograph crushes all other images by its tyranny: no more prints, no more figurative painting, unless henceforth by fascinated (and fascinating) submission to the photographic model.”

Roland Barthes, “Camera Lucida”; page 118.

Thus we see the suggestion forming that photography actually crushes the productive tendencies of thought.

Deleuze sees the same problem, and even goes so far as to suggest that photography demands to be overthrown, to be thrown off as if an oppressive yoke; and this, as surely as one must rid oneself of clichés, habitualizations of thought, and general agreements of common sense, should one ever intend to make any headway whatsoever in the realm of the philosophic, and in venturing toward the creation of new concepts:

“In the first place, there are figurative givens. Figuration exists, it is a fact, and it is even a prerequisite of painting. We are besieged by photographs that are illustrations, by newspapers that are narrations, by cinema-images, by television-images. There are psychic clichés just as there are physical clichés - ready-made perceptions, memories, phantasms. There is a very important experience here for the painter: a whole category of things that could be termed “clichés” already fills the canvas, before the beginning. It is dramatic. Cézanne seems to have effectively passed through this dramatic experience at its highest point. Clichés are always already on the canvas, and if the painter is content to transform the cliché, to deform or mutilate it, to manipulate it in every possible way,
Photography, it seems, is as mutually exclusive of productive thought as perceptual consciousness is of imaging consciousness.

It was in the course of Deleuze’s ongoing search for new conceptual configurations that he turned to the paintings of Francis Bacon for inspiration. Deleuze intended to take from Bacon’s approach to painting something that would newly inform writing in ways as yet unguessed. Deleuze saw a direct correlation between the acts of painting and writing; a connectivity which is not obviously apparent for writing and photography:

“What in literature is called a style also exists in painting: an assemblage of lines and colors. And a writer is recognized by his or her way of enveloping, unfurling or breaking a line in “his” or “her” sentences... We can therefore imagine a common or comparable world between painters and writers. And that is precisely the aim of calligraphy.”

Gilles Deleuze: ‘Painting Sets Writing Ablaze’, in “Two Regimes of Madness”; page 182.

That a sense of productive conceptuality is shared by painting and writing suggests that philosophy might be able to uncover within painting something of its own productive nature. We should note here in passing that excluding photography from such considerations suggests an impression having already formed somewhere that photography itself has no ‘creative style’ to speak of beyond that of resemblance and representation.

That is certainly a debatable point; but there is a sense in which even stylized representation might be considered cliché when contrasted with painting:

> Figure 01-9a: Diminishing Resemblance <

“In the case of other arts, the conflict with clichés is very important, but it mostly remains outside the work although it is inside the author. Except in the case of Artaud, for whom the collapse of ordinary linguistic coordinates are part of the work. In painting, however, it is a rule: the painting comes from an optical catastrophe that remains present in the painting itself.”


Such was Deleuze’s dedication toward creating philosophy ever anew that we constantly find him pushing his inquiry into the nature of thought further and deeper than any other contemporary philosopher. In this, we can clearly see why Deleuze rejected photography as a possible source for new philosophic concepts: the very heart of what freed painting from simple representation, the ‘optical catastrophe,’ is exactly that which would prevent photography from functioning to its own adequation. Photography is predicated...
upon optical accuracy, and is entirely dedicated to constantly improving the tolerances which determine its ability to accurately resolve visual detail. Even the most minute forms of 'optical catastrophe,' in the form of dust specks, are not to be tolerated.

And yet, even at the point where this realization is reached, we find something somewhat odd: photography has somehow managed to insert itself into the very heart of that whole process of which it has tried in vain to attain some semblance! Photography is not and can not be something of thought’s productive capacity; yet, here it is casually appearing at the heart of philosophic inquiry, with no thought given to the implications of its presence there.

Consider Alberto Korda’s iconic photograph of Che Guevara (taken at a memorial service on March 5th, 1960; and coincidentally, with Jean Paul Sartre sitting nearby): so widely distributed by ‘free market’ forces that it is generally considered to be the most commonly reproduced photograph in history, it is an image that is never acquired as a statement made in support of capitalism. Again, photography has asserted its ability to insert itself in positions which would logically seek its exclusion; and has done so as casually as that way in which Deleuze and Bacon refer to photography, even as they seek to push their work beyond the bounds of representational thought.

It seems there is still something about photography which grants it access to the very core of those processes that it has been labelled as unable to produce in and of itself. We must suspect, then, that all is not as we have been led to believe concerning photography: we must in fact suspect that there are indeed dynamics inherent in photography which are not simple derivations of representational processes. There must be aspects of photography which we would never encounter simply in contending with photography’s dependence upon resemblance and representation. We must instead find a different way to look at photography; a conclusion also reached by Barthes:

> Figure 01-10a: No Resemblance <

The Mad Image of Photography

What, then, is this photographic madness of which Roland Barthes speaks? What is its nature, and where does it arise? Barthes did in fact describe exactly where this madness forms:

“Mad or tame? Photography can be one or the other: tame if its realism remains relative, tempered by aesthetic or empirical habits (to leaf through a magazine at the hairdresser’s, the dentist’s); mad if this realism is absolute and, so to speak, original, obliging the loving and terrified consciousness to return to the very letter of Time: a strictly revulsive movement which reverses the course of the thing, and which I shall call, in conclusion, the photographic ecstasy.”

Roland Barthes, “Camera Lucida”; page 119.

Beyond the reassuring stability of representation; and, outside the clichéd conviviality of resemblance: there seems to be something unique and quite singular about photography; something, it appears, which is quite mad but, also potentially very liberating - in a Nietzschean kind of way. Somehow, despite its obvious alignment with the paradigm of directly perceptual consciousness, photography can and does cause people to pause and give thought to that which it depicts.
this object has indeed existed and that it has been there where I see it.... The Photograph then becomes a bizarre medium, a new form of hallucination: false on the level of perception, true on the level of time: a temporal hallucination, so to speak, a modest, shared hallucination (on the one hand “it is not there,” on the other hand “but it has indeed been”): a mad image, chafed by reality.”


Thus the ‘madness’ of photography, and that which in effect liberates it from the constraints of representation, is in the nature of “hallucination.” Moreover, this is a ‘shared hallucination’; and it is a positional hallucination, formed from a conflict between the photograph’s point-of-origin and its subsequent locations.

This in itself is of great interest; for, when we saw photography inserting itself within the work of both Deleuze and Bacon, it did so within the context of location. We shall return to this point at length; but first we should note something else which binds together Barthes’ grasp of The Photograph and Deleuze’s reading of Bacon’s paintings. Of his encounter with photography, Barthes said:

“I then realized that there was a sort of link (or knot) between Photography, madness, and something whose name I did not know... It was a broader current than a lover’s sentiment. In the love stirred by Photography (by certain photographs), another music is heard, its name oddly old-fashioned: Pity.”


And of Bacon’s paintings, Deleuze notes:

“The mouth then acquires this power of nonlocalization that turns all meat into a head without a face. It is no longer a particular organ, but the hole through which the entire body escapes, and from which the flesh descends (here the method of free, involuntary marks will be necessary). This is what Bacon calls the Scream, in the immense pity that the meat evokes.”


> Figure 01-11a: Escaping Into A Scream <

In both Barthes’ phenomenological reading of The Photograph, and Deleuze’s encounter with The Figure as painted by Francis Bacon, we find a common sentimentality. This is a sentiment both philosophers describe as pity; but, it is not a pity based upon some material loss or, within any sentimentality for something nostalgically recalled: it is a pity invoked through what Barthes describes as madness, and Deleuze describes as hysteria. It is a pity provoked by some lapse of conceptuality, by a loss of the ability for consciousness to order itself adequately to its necessary tasks. This ‘pity’ is not evoked by one’s own state but, rather, in an encounter with circumstances that one might find oneself immersed within, given a corresponding (and often catastrophic) chain of events. It is a pity of position, conveyed by the presence of another that one might easily find oneself in the place of:

“Presence, presence ... this is the first word that comes to mind in front of one of Bacon’s paintings. Could this presence be hysterical? The hysteric is at the same time someone who imposes his or her presence, but also someone for whom things and beings are present, too present, and who attributes to every thing and communicates to every being
this excessive presence. There is therefore little difference between the hysteric, the “hystericized,” and the “hystericizor”.

Gilles Deleuze, “The Logic of Sensation”; page 50.

> Figure 01-12a: Force and Sensation; Pity the Meat <

This is the common element which connects the madness Barthes sees in The Photograph, and the hysteria of The Figure which Deleuze finds in Bacon’s paintings: both convey a certain ‘presence’ which is the realization of a position that any viewer might find themselves in; and it is a sense of presence inherent in the actual act of viewing either the photograph or the painting.

In either case, both The Photograph and The Painting provide a common point for a potential multitude of viewers; and in this case, that which is viewed is providing a common reference for all viewers. Generally, what occurs at this point tends to be described in terms of aesthetics; however, Deleuze provides us with an interesting alternative by way of his inquiries into the writings of the German philosopher Leibniz:

“At the basis of each individual notion, it will indeed be necessary for there to be a point of view that defines the individual notion. If you prefer, the subject is second in relation to the point of view. And after all, to say that is not a piece of cake, it’s not inconsiderable.”

“. . . What makes me = me is a point of view on the world. Leibniz cannot stop. He has to go all the way to a theory of point of view such that the subject is constituted by the point of view and not the point of view constituted by the subject. Fully into the nineteenth century, when Henry James renews the techniques of the novel through a perspectivism, through a mobilization of points of view, there too in James’s works, it’s not points of view that are explained by the subjects, it’s the opposite, subjects that are explained through points of view. An analysis of points of view as sufficient reason of subjects, that’s the sufficient reason of the subject. The individual notion is the point of view under which the individual expresses the world. It’s beautiful and it’s even poetic. James has sufficient techniques in order for there to be no subject; what becomes one subject or another is the one who is determined to be in a particular point of view.”

“It’s the point of view that explains the subject and not the opposite.”


> Figure 01-12b: Retiring Early <

The way in which this occurs is of particular interest to us here; after all, we are generally use to considering subjects as defining points-of-view. But, no: here we have encountered the opposite approach:

“But what determines this point of view? Leibniz says: understand, each of us expresses the totality of the world, only he expresses it in an obscure and
confused way. Obscurely and confused means what in Leibniz’s vocabulary? That means that the totality of the world is really in the individual, but in the form of minute perception. Minute perceptions. Is it by chance that Leibniz is one of the inventors of differential calculus? These are infinitely tiny perceptions, in other words, unconscious perceptions. I express everyone, but obscurely, confusedly, like a clamor.

“Later we will see why this is linked to differential calculus, but notice that the minute perceptions of the unconscious are like differentials of consciousness, it’s minute perceptions without consciousness. For conscious perceptions, Leibniz uses another word: apperception. Apperception, to perceive <L’aperception, apercevoir>, is conscious perception, and minute perception is the differential of consciousness which is not given in consciousness. All individuals express the totality of the world obscurely and confusedly. So what distinguishes a point of view from another point of view? On the other hand, there is a small portion of the world that I express clearly and distinctly, and each subject, each individual has his/her own portion, but in what sense? In this very precise sense that this portion of the world that I express clearly and distinctly, all other subjects express it as well, but confusedly and obscurely.

“It’s the proportion of the region of the world expressed clearly and distinctly by an individual in relation to the totality of the world expressed obscurely and confusedly. That’s what point of view is.”


It is impossible not to notice the affinity these ‘minute perceptions’ mentioned by Leibniz have with what Barthes terms ‘photographic punctum.’ This in turn suggests that the ‘blind field’ Barthes notes forming of photographic punctum might in some way be considered in terms of those subjectivities which form from points-of-view. Certainly such subjectivity is not a ‘unary space’; for, if we can say that any particular point-of-view is sufficient to define a sense of subjectivity, we must also realize that such subjectivity will necessarily vary from individual to individual:

“Each individual notion has its point of view, that is from this point of view, it extracts from the aggregate of the world that it expresses a determined portion of clear and distinct expression. Given two individuals, you have two cases: either their zones do not communicate in the least, and create no symbols with one another -- there aren’t merely direct communications, one can conceive of there being analogies -- and in that moment, they have nothing to say to each other; or it’s like two circles that overlap: there is a little common zone, there we can do something together. Leibniz thus can say quite forcefully that no two individual substances have the same point of view or exactly the same clear and distinct zone of expression. And finally, Leibniz’s stroke of genius: what will define the clear and distinct zone of expression that I have? I express the totality of the world, but I only express clearly and distinctly a reduced portion of it, a finite portion. What I express clearly and distinctly, Leibniz tells us, is what relates to <qui a trait> my body. We will see what this body means, but what I express clearly and distinctly is that which affects my body.”

In viewing the same photograph or painting, we are all at more or less the same point-of-view; however, this does not mean that we will all experience the same subjective responses. As individuals, we all express to greater or lesser degrees of clarity the variations of that which we experience; and that which affects me of any particular point-of-view may not at all so affect another person.

Even so, we might well postulate that, for every distinct point-of-view, there might be some complimentary relationship of subjectivity which links the differentials of minute perceptions there provided with a distinctive tendency toward conscious apperception.

Deleuze has a name for this positional presence: he calls it, with reference to the occurrence of The Figure in Bacon’s paintings, “The Attendant.”

If we are going to unravel this riddle of how photography, as characteristically of perceptual consciousness, somehow manages to insert itself into those creative processes grounding that productive ability through which consciousness makes of itself something ever new and previously unthought, then this is where we must begin to tease apart the constituent threads of philosophy’s post-structural texture.

This we shall proceed to do by attending toward those peripheral and differential elements which cluster about the concepts we will trace alignments between in the course of this inquiry. These differential elements will function for us as minute perceptions (among other ‘things’) and, because of this, our inquiry will not yield to us a structurally unary space of imaginary variation; for we are not proceeding here as a community of passive readers: instead, we shall be proceeding as if a community of productive writers.
The Attendant

Pity; hysteria; hallucination; madness: the closer that photography and painting draw together, the farther they seem to be from what is generally considered the ‘normal state of affairs’ for consciousness. Yet, both are retained within, as normal fixtures of, our everyday lives: both paintings and photographs are everywhere around us.

How is it that such madness, such hysteria irrupts in our midst; and does so in such a way that we can feel pity in these encounters: and why, when this happens, do we accept this situation as a common matter of course? It is a strange disparity we are encountering here: on the one hand, it occurs with a certainty similar to that of the disjunction between perceptual and imaging consciousness; and on the other hand, it seems to be as intimately intertwined as consciousness is with itself.

Sartre, through investigating the pathology of the imagination, firmly established that such outbreaks of hysterical madness are in fact simply an aspect of that natural spontaneity which necessarily characterizes consciousness:

“The patients believe that they are under the influence of one or more persons. But what has rarely been clarified is that this belief in ‘influence’ is a way for the patients to still affirm the spontaneity of their thoughts and all their psychic acts. When a patient declares ‘I am given bad thoughts, I am made to form obscene thoughts’, we must not believe that the patient feels these bad thoughts to stagnate or float like bits of wood on water. The patient feels their spontaneity and does not dream of denying it. Only, the patient notes that this spontaneity is manifested in isolation, as a countercurrent, breaking the unity if not of consciousness then at least of personal life. This is the deep sense of the idea of influence: the patients feel that it is they, as living, animated spontaneities, who are producing these thoughts and at the same time that these thoughts are not willed. Hence the expression ‘I am made to think...’ So the syndrome of influence is nothing other than the acknowledgment, by the patient, of the existence of a counter-spontaneity. The pure and ineffable experience (which corresponds to the cogito) always gives the patient this absurd or inopportune thought as something concerning which the cogito can be effected; but at the same time the thought escapes the patient, the patient is not responsible for it, does not recognize it.”

Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Imaginary”; page 156.

We are dealing here with a very particular kind of ‘position’: one which is not necessarily connected to any specific point-of-view. Thus we must conclude that we are not dealing with any definite instance of subjectivity; and yet, whatever we are encountering here and, however far it might be from what we are, this is something which is always closer to ourselves than anything else we will ever encounter. This is the positional immanence of our thought’s own spontaneity within (and as) ourselves.

Deleuze, in his analysis of Francis Bacon’s paintings, isolates the functional occurrence of such ‘counter-spontaneity’ within Bacon’s work:

> Figure 02-1a: Consciousness of Self <

“In many cases there seems to subsist, distinct from the Figure, a kind of spectator, a voyeur, a photograph, a passerby, an “attendant”: notably, but not exclusively, in the triptychs, where it is almost a law. However, we will see that, in his paintings and especially in his triptychs, Bacon needs the function of an attendant, which is not a spectator but part
of the Figure. Even the simulacra of photographs, hung on a wall or a railing, can play this role of an attendant. They are attendants not in the sense of spectators, but as a constant or point of reference in relation to which a variation is assessed. The sole spectacle is in fact the spectacle of waiting or effort, but these are produced only when there are no longer any spectators.”


Here we have the function of ‘attendant’ as an offshoot of the Figure; much as how, according to Sartre, pathological conditions of the imagination confront consciousness with its own spontaneity. This is the essential nature of the hallucination; this is the phenomenological configuration in which hysteria takes form. This is where minute perceptions compose conscious apperception; this is where the photographic punctum produces a ‘blind field’: this is that active production of thought which dispels habitualized clichés.

It should not surprise us that spontaneity is responsible for displacing the cliché and dispelling the habitual, both in photography and painting; but there are nonetheless a few unexpected turns to be noted concerning Deleuze’s assessment of “The Attendant.”

Then comes our second surprise, which contains a major insight. Deleuze tells us exactly how photographs function in their role of attendant; they are found here as:

“...a constant or point of reference in relation to which a variation is assessed...”

If point-of-view defines subjectivity, then variations in point-of-view will as a matter of consequence produce a robustly variable sense of subjectivity. We have of course encountered something remarkably similar to this situation before, in Edmund Husserl’s technique of ‘imaginary variation,’ which was phenomenology’s core methodology. However, we are not here seeing the production of a structurally ideal concept, such as Husserl sought to establish. Instead, we are seeing simply the stabilization of a variable subjectivity: we are seeing the production of a ‘blind field,’ as, difference.

Bacon is using photographs in the role of ‘attendant’ to produce what Sartre called ‘The pure and ineffable experience (which corresponds to the cogito)’. The difference here, of course, is that it is no longer a ‘universal truth of identity’ which is being determined and defined; instead, it is a singular, unique, and contingent positional variance. Where Husserl would have ‘bracketed’ the ego, the sense of ‘self,’ and would have tried to exclude its influence from his philosophic investigations to as great an extent as he could manage, we find here something quite different. Here we are inquiring into how ‘the self’ varies from itself; and, we are visually investigating the differential aspects of that variance. This is a decidedly post-structural turn, and one that can only come about with a realization that the apparent unity of Descartes’ cogito conceals a fractured and fragmented self which is often at odds with its own occurrence. This is the modern cogito of desire-as-production, not the classical cogito of a universal and unchanging ideal:

> Figure 02-2a: Self Consciousness <

“The modern cogito (and this is why it is not so much the discovery of an evident truth as a ceaseless task
to be undertaken afresh) must traverse, duplicate, and reactivate in an explicit form the articulation of thought on everything within it, around it, and beneath it which is not thought, yet which is nevertheless not foreign to thought, in the sense of an irreducible, an insuperable exteriority. In this form, the *cogito* will not therefore be the sudden and illuminating discovery that all thought is thought, but the constantly renewed interrogation as to how thought can reside elsewhere than here, and yet so very close to itself; how it can be in the forms of non-thinking. The modern *cogito* does not reduce the whole being of things to thought without ramifying the being of thought right down to the inert network of what does not think.”

Michel Foucault, “The Order of Things”; page 353.

No longer taking thought for granted or as a ‘given,’ post-structuralism instead concerns itself with how thought arises, and why there is thought for us when nothing of the sort seems evident in other creatures (depending on how narrow a definition for ‘thinking’ is being used). Yet of course, this modern sense of the ‘*cogito*’ necessarily delves into those processes through which any sense of self arises: be they minute perceptions, spontaneities, or clinically defined neurological structures. This, in relation to photography and painting, must be the focus of our present inquiry.

**Localizing Conscious Spontaneity**

In the case of Bacon’s paintings, it would seem that the role of “The Attendant” is in effect being extracted from the positional variances offered by “The Photograph(s).” This is a case where, we might say, the ‘shared hallucination of mad images’ is being distilled into a ‘positional hysteria’ which retains the one essential universality still possible for the phenomenological method following Sartre’s incisive critique: that of the spontaneity which defines consciousness as a form of production.

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We must note, then, that even if photographs do not themselves capture the essential spontaneity of consciousness, they are nonetheless capable of producing it - even if such production seems, in this particular case, to be more characteristic of hallucination than of thought.

As Barthes says:

“In this glum desert, suddenly a specific photograph reaches me; it animates me, and I animate it. So that is how I must name the attraction which makes it exist: an animation. The photograph itself is in no way animated (I do not believe in “lifelike” photographs), but it animates me: this is what creates every adventure.”


As the photograph animates the viewer, so also Bacon uses the positional variance supplied by photographs to animate his paintings through the influence of “The Attendant.” We would say here, along with Leibniz, that the point-of-view defined by The Photograph produces the viewer’s sense of subjectivity, even if this is a spontaneous subjectivity that is at odds with that sense of consciousness which produces it. However, Barthes’ interpretation is not in complete agreement with the section to which it refers in Sartre’s “The Imaginary”:

“But it is necessary to emphasize the fact that what distinguishes the different positional types is the thetic character of the intention, and not the
existence or non-existence of the object... if I look at the photos in a magazine, they can very well ‘say nothing to me’, which is to say I look at them without positing their existence... One could also find cases where the photo leaves me in such a state of indifference that I do not carry out any imaging.

“The photograph is vaguely constituted as an object, and the people that it depicts are indeed constituted as people, but solely because of their resemblance to human beings, without any particular intentionality. They float between the shores of perception, sign, and image, without touching any of them.

“On the contrary, the imaging consciousness that we produced before a photograph is an act and this act includes a nonthetic consciousness of itself as spontaneity. We have consciousness, of some sort, of animating the photo, of lending life to it in order to make an image of it.”

Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Imaginary”; page 24-25.

Thus in Sartre’s view, it is the spontaneity of the viewer’s consciousness which animates the photograph, which engages with it. And if the photograph is animated by the viewer, then, we have to say (in keeping with Sartre’s subsequent findings regarding the nature of hallucination) that this can only occur to the extent that the viewer’s “self” becomes an irreal spontaneity. This would be consistent with the approach taken by Leibniz: we would say here that the point-of-view provided by The Photograph produces a sense of subjectivity in the form of an irreal spontaneity of conscious apperception; yet, as this always occurs through an individual, such production might or might not ‘overlap’ with any particular person’s own “determined portion of clear and distinct expression.” It is a question, once again, of the relationships holding between those spontaneities which arise within consciousness, as the experience of being conscious.

Barthes, for his part, would insist that the dominant characteristic of The Photograph is the fact that its point-of-view must have existed at some time; and it is this disjunction between the spontaneity of the viewer and the actuality of the viewed which animates the viewer into the ‘adventure’ which viewing The Photograph becomes. This disjunction regarding the concept of ‘animation’ is one that apparently hinges upon a distinction between that which is posited, and that which is positional.

But, far from being confronted with a problem in the consistency of our analysis, what we have encountered here is an opportunity: for, this is precisely the kind of differential texture that we have been trying to find by aligning the conceptual perspectives of different philosophers. Here, instead of a difficulty in imposing the ‘unary space’ of an imaginary variation, we can instead expect to see new concepts forming.

We could argue back and forth, between Sartre and Barthes, over whether it is primarily the photograph or the person viewing it that becomes ‘animated’; but, there is another option available to us here: one opened by Sartre, and then developed much later by Deleuze and Guattari. In continuing to describe the pathology of the imagination, Sartre notes:

“This way of conceiving spontaneity is only an implicit manner of admitting the existence of the unconscious. It seems to me therefore that these absurd systems are nothing other than the way in which consciousness thinks its present state, which is to say this twilight levelling-down. But it is not a case of a normal thought, positing the object before the subject, it is not a case of a thought about this twilight state. But somewhere in this consciousness...
that is incapable of concentrating, on the margins, isolated and furtive, appears a partial system that is the thought of this twilight state or, if you wish, that is this twilight state itself. It is a case of an imaging symbolic system that has for its correlate an irreal object - absurd phrase, pun, inopportune appearance [note 27 - “I will better explain the symbolism in the section on the Dream”]. It appears and is given as spontaneity but, above all, as impersonal spontaneity. To tell the truth, we are very far from the distinction between subjective and objective. These two worlds have collapsed: we are dealing here with a third type of existence that we lack the words to characterize. The simplest can perhaps be named lateral irreal apparitions, correlates of an impersonal consciousness.”

Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Imaginary”; page 158.

In describing hallucinatory states, Sartre presents us with the concept of “lateral irreal apparitions”: a very apt description of The Figure’s “Attendant” in the paintings of Francis Bacon. It is also interesting to note here that Sartre is making references to an “impersonal spontaneity,” to “impersonal consciousness”: for this corresponds to what Barthes referred to as the “shared” nature of The Photograph’s hallucinatory status. The partiality of The Photograph isn’t of the viewer, it is of The Photograph’s point-of-view, as positional variance; a partiality which Barthes finds exemplified in those elements within individual photographs that he refers to as punctum.

When we are considering the spontaneity of consciousness, we are doing so at a point before any distinction between subject and object can be made. When our analysis has advanced to this particular configuration of consciousness, we are no longer considering a distinct and distinguishing separation between these concepts: we are instead looking at their immanence in the event of their production. We are in a situation where, as Deleuze noted earlier, “There is therefore little difference between the hysteric, the “hystericized,” and the “hystericizor.” Such a situation is not solely attributable to hysteria. This is the point where, as Leibniz demonstrated with reference to the relationship between minute perceptions and conscious apperception, consciousness is actually being produced; this is where thought happens. As Deleuze and Guattari note:

“Subject and object give a poor approximation of thought. Thinking is neither a line drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one around the other. Rather, thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth... Husserl demands a ground for thought as original intuition, which is like the earth inasmuch as it neither moves nor is at rest... Territory and earth are two components with two zones of indiscernibility - deterritorialization (from territory to earth) and reterritorialization (from earth to territory). We cannot say which comes first.”


If we are going to find any evidence that photography is capable of eliciting thinking, and soliciting thoughts that are newly formed, then we must look to those processes through which thought arises as the spontaneity of consciousness.

> Figure 02-5a: Ornette Coleman and Bern Nix <

Relativizing Horizons and Productive Apparition

At first glance, the prospect of finding that original spontaneity which is so characteristic of imaging consciousness somewhere within the seemingly irrevocably sensory parameters of photography’s representational
nature does not appear promising; it would appear that photography falls fully within processes of what we would have to call reterritorialization, whereby previously delimited conceptual patterns are imposed upon the fullness of the Earth. The lines of escape which cut across processes that establish territoriality, and so lead toward the liberating superfluity of the Earth’s open potential, do not seem evident in the static mode of image capture through which The Photograph is produced. It is upon these grounds that photography is criticized as representational, and as being incapable if eliciting original thoughts which produce new concepts.

However, when we consider what Husserl actually had to say concerning the phenomenological status held by the Earth for consciousness, we find that perhaps we are not ever in a position from which we might find access to this Earth being spoken of: perhaps, as members of a common humanity, we only ever encounter a humanized World:

“[note 87: For the Earth cannot become a mobile body: “It is on the Earth, toward the Earth, starting from it, but still on it that motion occurs. The Earth itself, in conformity to the original idea of it, does not move, nor is it at rest; it is in relation to the Earth that motion and rest first have sense. But then the Earth does not ‘move’ nor is at rest - and it is entirely the same for the heavenly bodies and for the earth as one of them”...”

“But toward the end of the text, the Earth takes on a more formal sense. No longer is it a question of this Earth here (the primordial here whose factuality would finally be irreducible), but of a here and a ground in general for the determination of body-objects in general. For if I reached another planet by flying, and if, Husserl then said, I could perceive the earth as a body, I would have “two Earths as ground-bodies,” “But what does two Earths signify? Two pieces of a single Earth with one humanity”. From then on the unity of all humanity determines the unity of the ground as such. This unity of all humanity is correlative to the unity of the world as the infinite horizon of experience, and not to the unity of this earth here. The World, which is not the factuality of this historical world here, as Husserl often recalls, is the ground of grounds, the horizon of horizons, and it is to the World that the transcendental immutability attributed to the Earth returns, since the Earth then is only its factual index. Likewise - correlatively - humanity would then only be the facto-anthropological index of subjectivity and of intersubjectivity in general, starting from which every primordial here can appear on the foundation of the Living Present, the rest and absolute maintenance of the origin in which, by which, and for which all temporality and all motion appear.]”


It may be, then, that what we should be asking is whether there is a sense in which photography can ever leave this humanized World horizon, and could ever point back toward a more primordial Earth. Such a possibility would necessarily define photography in terms of deterritorialization, and firmly establish an ability for The Photograph to produce creative lines of escape which are not inherently reifying and objectified. Could this be possible; and if so, in what way should this possibility be conceptualized?

If we can be so bold as to consider thinking to be the definitional horizon through which philosophy emerges, then we might say, to paraphrase Husserl using the words of Deleuze and Guattari, something like: “It is from thought, toward thought, starting from thought and always still within thought, that thinking occurs.” In saying such, we
would find ourselves alongside Sartre, in considering the spontaneity of an impersonal consciousness.

Although all of this sounds somewhat redundant, as if nothing were actually being said here, in fact this nicely describes the immanence of consciousness to itself; that is to say, how consciousness varies from itself without being different from itself. This is where we find intersubjectivity forming: although, if we are to describe such formations without prejudicing their nature, we must stipulate that what is in fact forming here is a relativizing horizon from which subjectivity precipitates; which is to say, an intersubjective point-of-view from which subjectivity forms: we are in fact describing Sartre’s concept of an impersonal consciousness.

Such relativizing horizons are something we have been considering all along, as that which characterizes the basic relational commonality inherent within both photography and painting; which is to say, our primary point of interest in all of this: how photography and painting might be adjunct to thought, in such a way that either might somehow suffice in leading us toward thoughts as yet unthought.

We must consider, then, that the common element for such a horizon of humanity is in fact defined by the multiplicity of its differences; that, ‘the World’ of which Husserl speaks always occurs as specific and contingent relationships holding between consciousness and the Earth, through the formation of territorializations. This would imply that the fractured nature of our modern cogito’s self-variance occurs through movements of deterritorialization and reterritorialization: not that consciousness encounters itself through thinking, but, that thought is a process which selectively maps out specific aspects of consciousness, or, surveys that immanence which is consciousness, through specific encounters with ‘The Earth’; and in doing so, creates relativizing horizons which become our subjectivities.

In other words, this is the point where it becomes readily apparent that we must abandon the universal ideality of a primordial Earth’s ‘Unified World Horizon’ in favour of those very elements Husserl systematically excluded through his technique of ‘imaginary variation’; these being the peripheral elements of differential texture which Derrida subsequently stresses throughout his post-structural analyses. Here we find the ‘minute perceptions’ of Leibniz which are constituent of ‘lateral irreal apparitions’; which, for Sartre, occur as the spontaneity of an impersonal sense of consciousness emerging as conscious apperception from the obscurity of its nonthetic origin. It is here, when we consider Barthes’ analysis of the photographic punctum and the ‘blind field’ it produces, that we begin to see how photography might be able to contribute directly to new formations of thought and to the production of original concepts.

This is where The Photograph becomes a ‘mad image’; this is where The Figure in painting becomes hysterical. This is the process through which point-of-view can produce a sense of subjectivity; and it is this process itself which is of greatest interest to us.

We might then stipulate that “The Earth” constitutes the basic positional nature for any possible point-of-view; and as such, it has for us a generalized subjective correlate: that of humanity. However, that position of subjectivity is never self-identical: it is always variable and exists only through its differential nature. This is why the movement from territory to Earth is deterritorializing: because The Earth always occurs through the differential element of a variable subjectivity. This is why the movement from Earth to territory is always reterritorializing: because then differential variability is being segmented and constrained. In this, we must realize that the only generalized characteristic distinctly attributable to humanity as such is its plurality: that is, the self-variant spontaneity which makes our sense of consciousness so definably human. Subjectivity is always a difference, whether it is the hysteria of The Attendant or the madness of The Punctum.

This is where Deleuze and Guattari introduce their very specific approach to analyzing those spontaneities through which conscious apperception arises: that of
terриториализация. Таким образом, отношения между точкой зрения и субъективностью становятся не общими, а двумя отдельными процессами, которые можно разделить на два этапа: дезтерриториализацию и ре-территориализацию. Дезтерриториализация включает продуктивную спонтанность; ре-территориализация обесценивает ее.

Итак, не должно нас удивлять, что Делюис и Гваттари концептуализируют такие процессы территориализации, поскольку они говорят о "геофилософии". Что особенно интересно здесь, так это то, что эти геофилософические процессы сопровождаются эмбодионом, который был описан Сартре как характеристика для производства мысли. После этого анализ проходит дальше, где субъект и объект встречаются как два отдельных явления, которые могут быть описаны как оба явления, которые мы должны увидеть: мы должны увидеть, что мы видим.

Итак, вопрос, который нас здесь занимает, это то, какое значение имеет позиционная природа фотографии, как и позиционная природа Земли, в производстве концептуальных персонажей?

> Фигура 02-8а: Проявление <

Мы можем отметить, что концепция Сартре о нон-фейц коннсиссисе как "слева" "неявное" "проявление", "корреляты impersonalного сознания"" означала бы, с позиции Канта, коррелирует условия, которые определяют "проявление". Это остается в соответствии с принципом Лейбница, что точка зрения составляет субъективность; но, если мы работаем с ситуациями, которые возникают до образования субъекта / объекта, то мы должны сказать, что мы имеем дело с "проявлениями", которые имеют место.

Гиллес Делюис. Лекция по Либницу: 20/05/1980; страница 9. Переводчик: Чарльз Ж. Сивале

"Когда Кант использует слово "феномен", он дает ему гораздо более мощное значение: это не визуальное, которое отделяет нас от сущности, это присутствие, что появляется, как появляется. Феномен в работе Канта не является присутствием, а присутством как появляется. Феномен это показано в каком-то смысле... Феномен: это то, что появляется в пространстве и времени. Это больше не означает чувственного визуального, это означает пространственно-временные проявления. Проявление в отношении условий. Что появляется, появляется в соответствии с условиями его появления. Условия это "де-проявление". Эти условия, по которым что появляется, оказываются на конец. Концепция превращается в смысл присутствия. Понятие больше не означает сущности, которая была за пределами визуального; это что появляется, означает условия, которые определяют "проявление". Сущность уступает место значению. Концепция это не сущность вещи, это значение "проявления". Понимайте, что это новое понятие в философии, которое приведет к восхождению под именем новой дисциплины, феноменологии. Феноменология будет дисциплиной, которая рассматривает феномены как проявления, в зависимости от условий или смысла, а не как визуальные присутствия, которые относятся к сущностям."
the sense of ‘conditioning appearance’: that is, positional variances through which appearance becomes localized.

This would be consistent with the role of ‘Attendant’ in Francis Bacon’s paintings; and it would be consistent with the nature of hallucination which Barthes attributes to The Photograph. But, if we are simply saying that photographs and paintings make things appear, then we are not saying very much. Deleuze’s point would be that painting seems to have the ability to make new thoughts arise; so we must ask, have we yet encountered any indication of where photography might fit into those processes which embody the productive spontaneity of consciousness?

From the writings of Kant onward, such ‘apparitions’ which ‘constitute appearance’ will become established as those transcendental fields which inform all of the modern sciences: namely, time and space as independent of all conceptual variability. This is an intersubjectivity of universal commonality, which will not admit of any differential variance; and as such, point-of-view positionality will not produce anything here except what is generalized as common for all. This is a fundamental principle of scientific methodology: the repeatability of experimental findings.

However, it is the very nature of what a concept is which most directly concerns post-structural philosophy. Consequently, Deleuze and Guattari will direct their attentions toward those aspects of “apparition” which condition the ‘making appear’ of concepts in all their variability; and instead of universal commonality, this will be encountered in the form of singular consistency.

To this end we can note that, in contrast to Husserl’s use of “The Earth” as a universal backdrop for all possible experience, Francis Bacon has used the positional variance of photography to produce the horizon of an experientially differential backdrop for his paintings: in the form of “The Attendant.” And in fact, “The Attendant” will continue to play a role in the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, and in his collaborative efforts with Felix Guattari. Between “The Logic of Sensation” and “A Thousand Plateaus,” we find the concept of ‘rhythmic characters’ forming; and by “What Is Philosophy,” the last major collaborative effort between Deleuze and Guattari to be published, we see the emergence of “conceptual personae.”

There is, however, one very important consideration that we must not overlook here. If phenomenology is characterized by meaning, then we would be correct to point out the inherently semiological nature of Husserl’s core methodology, that of imaginary variation. Such forms of representational thought are not, however, characteristic of post-structural thought: for in embracing the differential nature of experience, post-structuralism has moved from a unified subject who asks “Why am I here”; through the hysteria of an impersonal consciousness that screams “Why are we doing this to me?” (“Hey, nothing personal”); and on, to a conceptual persona that creates itself through thinking “Where is it, exactly, that we are?”

This is where the philosophy of Deleuze and Guattari is most clearly defined as a “transcendental empiricism” which resolves into a Geophilosophy. In this, we can see the productive capabilities of consciousness shattering Descartes’ generalized ideal of the cogito into a positional variance which characterizes thought’s spontaneity: and conceptual personae, whose role within consciousness is to define, supply, and orchestrate those consistencies demanded in the production of concepts, have now emerged.

There is one other very important shift philosophy undertook in the development of post-structural thought which is of great methodological interest to us in the course of our present inquiry. In moving away from Husserl’s technique of imaginary variation, and the representational processes of signification structurally inherent within it, post-structuralism began to explore other linguistic processes. In particular, and in opposition to a semiological model based upon the signifier/signified dichotomy, a-signifying systems of anasemantic function produced the grammatological model utilized in post-structural linguistic analyses.
This development is at the core of the analytic methodology we are employing for our present inquiry: at no point are we considering concepts such as Barthes’ *punctum*, Leibniz’s ‘minute perceptions,’ or Sartre’s ‘lateral irreal apparitions’ to be even metaphorically equivalent; but, each of these concepts have distinct functions that can be defined in terms of a ‘before’ and an ‘after’ of their occurrence. It is this essential functionality (taking the verb “esse” in the sense of a becoming, not as an ascription of static, objective ‘being’) which we are both exploring and creating by way of the differential textures in which these concepts have been formed.

We can, in effect, switch such functionalities around to see what differences ensue; but to do so, we need to know the precise context in which these functions arose: this is why we need to pursue a distinctly pedagogic approach in the course of this inquiry, and why we need to include the extended quotations we are relying upon herein. If the production of conceptual personae can be described in terms of geophilosophy, such a sense of localization certainly and necessarily extends to the concepts that conceptual personae produce.

In this way, we can hope to compose a more properly post-structural concept of photography which goes beyond the technical parameters of its empirical occurrence; and eventually, to extract from this post-structural concept of photography a few new grammatological principles which might prove useful elsewhere.

As we have already noted, photography can and has played a definable role in establishing the nature of conceptual personae; and it does so positionally. Yes, photography does capture static images of events which have thus been isolated from the dynamics of their becoming. But when the relational horizon whereby movement is assessed shifts from The Earth to a World Horizon of Humanity; when the universality of that horizon is shown to conceal the experiential specificity of that self-variance which characterizes the spontaneity of consciousness; and when the positional variance that characterizes photography can be implicated in the self-variance of that productive spontaneity which is consciousness, then we must begin to question whether photography is in itself as inherently reifying as we have been led to believe.

Photography, then, is not found as a process which renders its subjects as objects, or, takes its objects as subjects: it is, by definition, necessarily a process of territorialization; and it is something which characteristically varies from itself, as demonstrated through Barthes’ analysis of the photographic *punctum*.

If the horizon of The Earth is taken as a ‘factual index,’ then photography is a never ending process of inventory; and part of what it appears to assist in the invention of, the corollary of a ‘facto-anthropological index of subjectivity and intersubjectivity in general,’ is the differential nature of that horizon of humanity which appears through the processes by which the Earth is territorialized: specifically, conceptual personae.

Thus, the next step our inquiry must take will be to define the productive nature of the relationship holding between photography and conceptual personae.

> Figure 02-10a: Neither Subject Nor Object <

Traditional Chinese penjing tree from the Montreal Botanical Gardens: these trees survive such as they are only through constant attention.

> Figure 02-10b: An Attended Territory <

In February of 1990, I had the unique opportunity to join a group of fellow environmentalists as they slipped into the Upper Carmanah Valley, on Vancouver Island, in British Columbia. That part of
the valley was already being logged, even though the valley is home to the tallest trees in Canada. But out of sight is all too often out of mind; and the Carmanah Valley was and still is in a very remote area. Our goal was to try and save this incredible old growth, temperate rainforest from destruction; and our plan was to bring this valley to the public’s attention by building the boardwalks and forest canopy research platforms needed to bring artists and scientists, as well as the general public, into the valley.

> Figure 02-11a: The Tallest Trees In Canada <

The Sitka Spruce of the Carmanah Valley are the tallest documented trees in Canada; but for some, this fact is nothing more than an opportunity for some quick profit.

> Figure 02-11b: Making Things Appear <

Part of the plan to protect the Upper Carmanah Valley from logging involved building forest canopy research platforms that could be used by scientists to study the ecosystem of an old growth forest’s upper branches. It is an amazing world up in the branches; everything is covered with moss, wispy pale green lichen hangs everywhere, and the surface area of the branches greatly exceeds that of the ground below: yet, almost nothing was known about this specific environment. The platforms we constructed were the first of their kind in Canada.

> Figure 02-11c: A Conditional Appearance <

The other part of the plan to save Carmanah Valley involved building boardwalks which the public could use to visit this area, so they could see it for themselves. This would also provide artists such as Robert Bateman with the opportunity to visit the Upper Carmanah Valley. However, some of the loggers living on Vancouver Island didn’t like that plan; so they blockaded the valley and, with public access temporarily cut off, they went in and destroyed the boardwalk we had built.

> Figure 02-11d: The Reconditioned Appearance <

So we waited until they left; and then we rebuilt it.

> Figure 02-11e Some of Those Who Attended <

Over seventy volunteers aided in the reconstruction effort; and today, The Carmanah and the adjacent Walbran Valleys are protected as a Provincial Park.
The Photograph

We could stop right here in our analysis of photography’s properly post-structural nature, content in having learned something new; however we would be doing ourselves a major disservice, because, we are now at the point where things start to become very interesting indeed.

Knowing as we do the actual role played by photographs in the eventual development of “conceptual personae” within the work of Deleuze and Guattari, we are now in a better position to localize the essential nature of photography within a Deleuzean framework.

As we noted earlier, photography seems to have some way of reinserting itself into the very heart of the philosophic processes we have seen Deleuze develop (and from which it had been definitionally excluded); and, to do so positionally. Bacon refers to photographs while painting; and he does so in reference to variation, namely positional variations which define points-of-view. Deleuze refers to photographs of Bacon’s paintings while writing; and afterward, he goes to see the actual paintings themselves. Barthes calls the photograph ‘a mad image,’ a ‘shared hallucination,’ because it is both here and not here at all; but it was somewhere: of that we can be absolutely certain.

Thus with photography, we are dealing with a sense of positionality which is of an ‘in between’ held in common for the viewer and the viewed. Photography is a form of territorialization; photography occurs situated in relation to the general horizon of The Earth; photography is definitional for The World of Humanity, but, in such a way as to be territorializing for conceptual personae. Photography becomes apparent where conceptual personae form a differentially relativizing Horizon of Humanity.

Keeping in mind that the essential characteristic of photography which defines its nature within post-structural philosophy is somehow related to positionality, we can now attempt to determine its place in relation to Deleuze’s overall philosophic system of concepts:

“Philosophy has three elements, each of which fits with the other two but must be considered for itself: the prephilosophical plane it lays out (immanence), the persona or personae it must invent and bring to life (insistence), and the philosophical concepts it must create (consistency).

“Laying out, inventing, and creating constitute the philosophical trinity - diagrammatic, personalistic, and intensive features.”


Having traced the idea of conceptual personae back through Deleuze’s encounter with the paintings of Francis Bacon, we can now see where photography must fit into post-structural philosophy. Being of an inherently positional nature, in some way The Photograph is of the prephilosophic plane. Its function is one of immanence; and it is of this that its resemblances are produced. The Photograph proceeds through territorialization; and if photography constitutes a form of survey that can serve to define a plane of immanence, then The Photograph is simply an orientation within that process of survey:

“It is essential not to confuse the plane of immanence and the concepts that occupy it. Although the same elements may appear twice over, on the plane and in the concept, it will not be in the same guise, even when they are expressed in the same verbs and words. We have seen this for being, thought, and one: they enter into the concept’s components and
are themselves concepts, but they belong to the plane quite differently as image or substance. Conversely, truth can only be defined on the plane by a “turning toward” or by “that toward which thought turns”; but this does not provide us with a concept of truth. If error itself is an element that by right forms part of the plane, then it consists simply in taking the false for the true (falling); but it only receives a concept if we determine its components (according to Descartes, for example, the two components of a finite understanding and an infinite will). Movements or elements of the plane, therefore, will seem to be only nominal definitions in relation to concepts so long as we disregard the difference in nature between plane and concepts. But in reality, elements of the plane are diagrammatic features, whereas concepts are intensive features. The former are movements of the infinite, whereas the latter are intensive ordinates of these movements, like original sections or differential positions: finite movements in which the infinite is now only speed and each of which constitutes a surface or a volume, an irregular contour marking a halt in the degree of proliferation. The former are directions that are fractal in nature, whereas the latter are absolute dimensions, intensively defined, always fragmentary surfaces or volumes. The former are intuitions and the latter are intensions. The grandiose Leibnizian or Bergsonian perspective that every philosophy depends upon an intuition that its concepts constantly developed through slight differences of intensity is justified if intuition is thought of as the envelopment of infinite movements of thought that constantly pass through a plane of immanence. Of course, we should not conclude from this that concepts are deduced from the plane: concepts require a special construction distinct from that of the plane, which is why concepts must be created just as the plane must be set up. Intensive features are never the consequence of diagrammatic features, and intensive ordinates are not deduced from movements or directions.

Their correspondence goes beyond even simple resonances and introduces instances adjunct to the creation of concepts, namely, conceptual personae.


It is most interesting that The Photograph must therefore be, in some directional sense, fractal in nature. This observation in itself certainly demands further inquiry, since it may allude to that positional variance we have already noted as being characteristic for photography. However, we need to do a little more legwork before we can adequately localize what would be the properly fractal nature of photography. To this end, we will have to consider first how photography would relate to the diagrammatic features created in the course of ‘laying out’ a philosophic plane of immanence. If we can define photography as being of the prephilosophic plane where diagrammatic features are found, then we can determine some of the post-structural characteristics that photography must have.

First, photography must exist as a characteristic ‘turning toward truth’ that can also be a turning toward error. Photography is an aspect of that survey which ‘sets up’ a plane of immanence; and within such survey, ‘The Photograph’ is an ‘orientation.’ As orientations, we can say that photographs occur in the form of diagrammatic features; and as such, they envelop ‘movements of the infinite.’ But, what are these; what does “movements of the infinite” actually refer to?

Deleuze notes that much of what was related to the infinite in Leibniz’s development of calculus was stripped out of the mathematics that were put to work in the various scientific fields which emerged with our modern world. However, “movements of the infinite” is by no means a modern philosophic concept: the use of infinitessimals in calculus is predicated upon an infinite divisibility of space; and this
particular form of infinity underlies what has been known since the Fourth century BC as Zeno's paradox. Space may be infinitely divisible; but, there must be in every case someone who is attending to the act of division: in this instance, a conceptual persona in the form of the philosopher Zeno.

We have to ask, then, what are these ‘movements of the infinite’ that constitute the plane of immanence? Let us consider for a moment a particularly interesting form of ‘infinity’ that Deleuze found in the writings of Leibniz:

“Every form that can be thought of as infinite by itself would be identical to itself, capable of being raised directly to infinity, by itself, and not by means of a cause: “nature susceptible to the last degree.” Such is the criterion. For example, can we imagine a speed, a number, or a color as infinite? In contrast, thought appears to be a form that can be raised to infinity, or even extension, under the condition that these forms are not wholes, and that they do not have parts: these are “absolutes,” “fundamental qualities,” “distinctly knowable qualities,” A, B, C...

Each one, being included in itself and including only itself, not being a whole and having no parts, has strictly no relation with an other. These are pure “disparities,” diverse absolutes that cannot be contradicted since no element exists that one can affirm or the other can deny. They are, as Blanchot would say, in a “nonrelation.” And this is just what the principle of contradiction states: it states that since two distinct Identicals cannot be contradicted by each other, they surely form a category.”


This particular form of infinity corresponds very nicely to the definition for immanence we have been working with. It also quite nicely encompasses Sartre’s description of that impersonal consciousness from which subjectivity precipitates. What we have here is in fact that differential continuity which constitutes what Deleuze and Guattari term ‘the plane of immanence.’ It is a chaotic immanence that we see forming here: it is an immanence in which no relations can form. If we are going to find movement within such an infinity, we must have some kind of relativizing ‘original ground,’ like Husserl’s original concept of The Earth; or, his subsequent concept for a World Horizon of Humanity: otherwise, there will be no possibility of defining relationships such as movement. Failing this, we will need some other truly radical approach which determines movement in a way that is not defined by measure: we are going to have to find some way in which relative movement precipitates out from the chaos of pure immanence.

This is where Deleuze and Guattari introduced the concept of territorialization, as it occurs in their Geophilosophy; because here, we must again consider that the only true point of phenomenological reference available to us is the variable horizon of those conceptual personae who effect a process of survey upon the plane of immanence. And in order that we might shift from the chaotic and fractal nature which defines the plane of immanence, toward a position where we can establish relationships such as movements within infinity, we must first lay out the plane of immanence by way of diagrammatic features. Eventually, we are going to have to determine how diagrammatic features and conceptual personae are related. It now appears that this relationship articulates upon positional variance; so although our analysis has widened to a considerable degree by this point in our inquiry, we can expect it to begin drawing together, and to coalesce, as we proceed.

Laying out the plane of immanence is a process, it seems, through which relationships are established of immanence; and this is something worth considering closely. In the shift we noted earlier, from a generalized World Horizon of Humanity to conceptual personae, we introduced a form
of variability which was not chaotic; and indeed, which was capable of consistently effecting relationships such as those that characterize territorialization. Deleuze and Guattari often note the role which consistency plays within philosophy:

“The plane of immanence is like a section of chaos and acts like a sieve. In fact, chaos is characterized less by the absence of determinations than by the infinite speed with which they take shape and vanish. This is not a movement from one determination to the other but, on the contrary, the impossibility of a connection between them, since one does not appear without the other having already disappeared, and one appears as disappearance when the other disappears as outline. Chaos is not an inert or stationary state, nor is it a chance mixture. Chaos makes chaotic and undoes every consistency in the infinite. The problem of philosophy is to acquire a consistency without losing the infinite into which thought plunges (in this respect chaos has as much a mental as a physical existence). To give consistency without losing anything of the infinite is very different from the problem of science, which seeks to provide chaos with reference points, on condition of renouncing infinite movements and speeds and of carrying out a limitation of speed first of all. Light, or the relative horizon, is primary in science. Philosophy, on the other hand, proceeds by presupposing or by instituting the plane of immanence: it is the plane’s variable curves that retain the infinite movements that turn back on themselves in incessant exchange, but which also continually free other movements which are retained. The concepts can then mark out the intensive ordinates of these infinite movements, as movements which are themselves finite which form, at infinite speed, variable contours inscribed on the plane. By making a section of chaos, the plane of immanence requires a creation of concepts.”


> Figure 03-4: A Relativizing Horizon <

What we are seeing here cannot be the relativizing World Horizon described by Husserl, because even if an attempt to institute a relativizing horizon upon the plane of immanence were to succeed, the result would not be philosophic: it would instead be characteristically scientific in nature. What we are instead seeking here is, simply, consistency; the consistency of apparition effected by a relativizing horizon that is differential rather than referential: which is to say, the consistency of conceptual personae. We need a form of relativizing horizon which is itself of immanence, and so is consistent with the plane of immanence from which it seeks to extract conceptual determinations.

It is those specific consistencies which characterize the differential nature of conceptual personae that we are most directly concerned with here; and we are primarily interested in finding out how they come to form in relation to diagrammatic features. Consistency is directly implicated in the laying out of the plane of immanence; and this activity localizes that shift from the chaotic to the conceptual which conceptual personae effect through sectioning the plane of immanence. The nature of this shift is such that it appears to be precipitated by movements of infinity which turn back on themselves: such movements would still be of immanence, since they are relative only to themselves; but they would also occur as those diagrammatic features we are now trying to isolate and define.

“Movement of the infinite does not refer to spatiotemporal coordinates that define the successive positions of a moving object and the fixed reference points in relation to which these positions
vary. “To orient oneself in thought” implies neither objective reference point nor moving object that experiences itself as a subject and that, as such, strives for or needs the infinite. Movement takes in everything, and there is no place for a subject and an object that can only be concepts. It is the horizon itself that is in movement: the relative horizon recedes when the subject advances, but on the plane of immanence we are always and already on the absolute horizon. Infinite movement is defined by a coming and a going, because it does not advance toward a destination without already turning back on itself, the needle also being the pole. If “turning toward” is the movement of thought toward truth, how could truth not also turn toward thought? And how could truth not turn away from thought when thought turns away from it? However, this is not a fusion but a reversibility, an immediate, perpetual, instantaneous exchange - a lightning flash. Infinite movement is double, and there is only a fold from one to the other. It is in this sense that thinking and being are said to be one and the same. Or rather, movement is not the image of thought without being also the substance of thought.


It is positionality itself, upon the absolute horizon of consistent immanence, which is relativizing; but, it is relativizing in the sense of location: and this being the case, it is a positional variance that is consistent with immanence. We have already encountered that kind of spontaneous self-variance which defines the immanence of consciousness and establishes the composite variability of conceptual personae: it is indeed a ‘turning back upon itself’ and, so much so that it initially appeared to us in the form of hysterical madness, and as Barthes’ photographic punctum. We now find that this is how diagrammatic features form of the plane of immanence, which certainly seems consistent with our placement of photography at this position within post-structural philosophy: for, what is photography but a turning toward something, as an orientation, which turns back on itself to produce itself as The Photograph? In this light, our tentative placement of photography with the diagrammatic features which lay out the plane of immanence continues to find justification within the works of Deleuze and Guattari:

“The philosophical faculty of coadaptation, which also regulates the creation of concepts, is called taste. If the laying-out of the plane is called Reason, the invention of personae Imagination, and the creation of concepts Understanding, then taste appears as the triple faculty of the still-undetermined concept, of the persona still in limbo, and of the still-transparent plane. That is why it is necessary to create, invent, and lay out, while taste is like the rule of correspondence of the three instances that are different in kind. It is certainly not a faculty of measuring. No measure will be found in those infinite movements that make up the plane of the immanence, in those accelerated lines without contour, and those inclines and curves; in those excessive and sometimes antipathetic personae; or in those concepts with irregular forms, strident intensities, and colors that are so bright and barbarous that they can inspire a kind of “disgust” (especially in repulsive concepts). Nonetheless, what appears as philosophical taste in every case is love of the well-made concept, “well-made” meaning not a moderation of the concept but a sort of stimulation, a sort of modulation in which conceptual activity has no limit in itself but only in the other two limitless activities.”

When we are dealing with the essential spontaneity of consciousness, it is not at all unusual to say that someone is acting ‘more or less like themself’: indeed, people will often themselves affirm that they are feeling somewhat ‘more’ or ‘less’ like themself than is usual for them. But, by how much? That is never a question which anyone asks: it is nonsensical within the context of that spontaneity we call consciousness. This is not something we can even conceive of measuring. In the same way, given a photograph composed of multiple punctum which are functioning as minute perceptions, it is impossible to “measure” how a ‘blind field’ produced by one viewer varies from that produced by another.

> Figure 03-6: Pure Punctum <

Whatever the nature of that positional variation which characterizes photography as somehow fractal, it is something that cannot be measured. This is something that is defined within the infinity of movements through which points-of-view are specified as singular through diagrammatic features: movements both to and from specific positionalities, movements of territorialization, movements of survey which define a plane of immanence upon a horizon of The Earth’s essential variance, by way of infinitely variable conceptual personae, and so on to infinity: movements of positional variance that localize apparition.

Therefore, it is of great interest to us that the act of ‘laying out’ the diagrammatic features which constitute any plane of immanence is here referred to as ‘Reason’, because, as ‘Rationality,’ we know that Reason contains the sense of ‘Ratio’ upon which resemblance is grounded. Beyond a sense of Ratio and resemblance, Reason also contains a sense of orientation, as that which can (or, as whatever does) cause a ‘turning toward either truth or error.’ It seems certain, then, that this is where we should place photography within the field of post-structural philosophy. The character of resemblance which so often casts photography in a representational role is in fact an integral process invariably inherent in the constitution of any plane of immanence; and as such, it is a necessary characteristic of photography however that might be implicated in the laying out of any prephilosophic plane, from which the imaging consciousness of conceptual personae produce concepts.

We also know that consistency is an integral part of photography; and indeed, determines the functional nature of photography’s mechanistic aspects. However, those particular consistencies are all matters determined through measurement; and these are the essential Ratios which inform the photographic process by establishing functional reference points used in defining determined relationships. These define the mechanisms whereby “…relations between the elements of one thing pass directly into the elements of another thing, which then becomes the image of the first - for example, the photograph, which captures relations of light…” (Deleuze, Logic of Sensation, pg. 115); so, even if such mechanistic consistencies place photography adjunct in its territorializations to the consistencies determined by way of localized apparition, as produced through immanences of The Earth and conceptual personae, we must still admit that such mechanistic consistencies are not adequate to the task of creating concepts.

Instead, the degree to which photography might be implicated in the production of concepts is suggested as being determined by the extent to which any infinite movements that are characteristically of the photographic are NOT defined by measurement, by differences-in-degree.

This specifically suggests that photography articulates a difference-in-kind within consistency, between the mechanistic consistencies of the camera and the infinity of movements captured when the camera turns back on any specific orientation to produce The Photograph:

“The important thing here is that the decomposition of the composite reveals to us two types of
multiplicity. One is represented by space (or rather, if all the nuances are taken into account, by the impure combination of homogenous time): It is a multiplicity of exteriority, of simultaneity, of juxtaposition, of order, of quantitative differentiation, of difference in degree; it is a numerical multiplicity, discontinuous and actual. The other type of multiplicity appears in pure duration: It is an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is a virtual and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers.”

“Now, this problem goes back to a scholar of genius, G.B.R. Riemann, a physicist and mathematician. Riemann defined as “multiplicities” those things that could be determined in terms of their dimensions or their independent variables. He distinguished discrete multiplicities and continuous multiplicities. The former contain the principle of their own metrics (the measure of one of their parts being given by the number of elements they contain). The latter found a metrical principle in something else, even if only in phenomena unfolding in them or in the forces acting in them.”

“Continuous multiplicities seemed to him to belong essentially to the sphere of duration. In this way, for Bergson, duration was not simply the indivisible, nor was it the non-measurable. Rather, it was that which divided only by changing in kind, that each was susceptible to measurement only by varying its metrical principles at each stage of the division.”


> Figure 03-7a: A Tenuous Moment In Time <

Thus, the consistent horizon of The Photograph is “the event,” which is itself implicated in (but not as) “the concept.” Or more accurately, both The Photograph and the concept derive their differential nature from the temporal difference-in-kind which characterizes “the event.” The Photograph is not of a reified “universal now” which would place it in relation to the static World Horizon of a generalized Humanity, such as Husserl postulated; it is instead of the temporal “event,” which is that infinitesimal difference-in-kind found between any “before” and any “after.” This is the nature of that ‘turning back upon itself’ which defines diagrammatic features as a form of self-variance: it is not a spatial relationship, it is instead a temporal distinction. We also know the specific nature of such a “before” and “after” when we place photography in the context of post-structural philosophy: it is that of territorialization, of the positional variances that distinguish between deterritorializations and reterritorializations; and it is characteristic of that self-variance which constitutes the immanence of consciousness in its productive apparition.

This is how photography can come to be implicated in those processes which lay out the prephilosophic plane of immanence upon which conceptual personae create concepts: through a defining relationship with ‘the event.’ In occurring as an ‘in between’ defining the consistency holding across instances of ‘before’ and ‘after,’ photography comes into being precisely as that variance of positionality which defines the directional changes captured by the singular nature of diagrammatic features upon any plane of immanence: that is, as singularities upon a horizon of event.

> Figure 03-7b: Before the Camera; After the Event <

Here we can also note the contingent specificity of photography, whereby individual photographs vary from each other; and this is a different kind of specificity than is the case with painting, since the process of photographic capture is entirely mechanical. These mechanistic consistencies, which are characteristically of difference-in-degree, firmly situate photography within relational functions that are implicated through Reason and Ratio in laying out any prephilosophic plane of immanence; but,
in being consistently and essentially differential (through the singular nature of The Photograph as temporal event), photography is also defined by differences which are outside itself: and this is where the relationship between photography and territorialization can be established. Photographs do not include the ‘before’ and ‘after’ that they connect as event; but, this is precisely the singular nature of their difference-in-kind: photographs are always ‘in between,’ and this is how they are capable of being essentially territorializing in nature.

An Insistent Divergence

It is now becoming apparent that the exclusion of photography from post-structural philosophy is contingent upon a definition of The Photograph which derives much from Husserl's reifying concept of a universal now; and that this generalized sense of a static temporality is in turn grounded in Husserl's use of sensory objectivity as the basis for his concept of certainty. By following the implications of Sartre's imaginative abandonment of that objective horizon grounded within this sensory certainty, we have found that there is good reason to question whether photography is truly as reifying and objectifying as we had been led to believe.

The productive creativity of painting has always been understood as being characterized by imaging consciousness, by the imagination; hence the divergence of analysis afforded to photography and painting within the context of post-structural philosophy. Yet, as we have very clearly seen, both photography and painting can be demonstrably localized within post-structural philosophy with reference to diagrammatic features; so, the question which now faces us is this: How do photography and painting differ in their apparent relationships with diagrammatic features? For, somewhere between The Attendant of Bacon's paintings and The Punctum of Barthes' photographs, there is a distinct disjunction in the way that the diagrammatic features of painting and of photography are related to the production of concepts by conceptual persona.

The nature of this divergence is not at first readily apparent. We must therefore first attempt to localize where this disjunction occurs conceptually.

Of photography, Barthes notes:

“Thus the air is a luminous shadow which accompanies the body; and if the photograph fails to show this air, then the body moves without a shadow, and once this shadow is severed, as in the myth of the Woman without a Shadow, there remains no more than a sterile body. It is by this tenuous umbilical cord that the photographer gives life; if he cannot, either by lack of talent or bad luck, supply the transparent soul its bright shadow, the subject dies forever.”

Roland Barthes, “Camera Lucida”; page 110.

> Figure 03-8a: Two Disbanded Musical Groups <

If this reminds us of the transcendental fields we encountered earlier with Kant, it does so with the qualification that this is decidedly a case of a self-variance that can only be described in terms of specific consistency, rather than a relativized self-similarity forming of some universal commonality. This is a case of apparition, of those conditions which are implied as of a making-appear; but on the condition that they are intersubjectively relativizing by way of territorialization, through the self-variance of a distinctly singular and specific difference-in-kind established between the ‘before’ of “the body” and the ‘after’ of its “shadow.” This is a case of The Photograph turning back on itself and so defining a self-relativizing ‘in between’ which constitutes a diagrammatic feature.

Bacon also makes mention of such a “shadow” in reference to “The Figure,” as it occurs in his paintings. We have every
reason at this point to suspect we are encountering here the inherent spontaneity of consciousness, asserting itself through its self-variance: which is to say, that we are dealing with the kind of ‘insistence’ through which conceptual personae form. To quote Deleuze on this matter:

“Bacon has often said that, in the domain of Figures, the shadow has as much presence as the body; but the shadow acquires this presence only because it escapes from the body; the shadow is the body that has escaped from itself through some localized point in the contour.”

Gilles Deleuze, “The Logic of Sensation”; page 16.

> Figure 03-9a: Musical Presence Personified; INXS <

If we can characterize the production of conceptual personae within philosophy as “insistence,” then we can define this ‘insistence’ in terms of a productive functionality. Whether we are dealing with Barthes’ photographic punctum, Sartre’s spontaneities of consciousness, the singularities of Leibniz’s minute perceptions, or Kant’s sense of apparition, we are encountering the kind of insistence upon which the formation of conceptual personae depends; and it is an insistence of consistency which forms of the immanence that characterizes the self-variance of diagrammatic features. If we are to begin an inquiry into the relationship between diagrammatic features and conceptual personae, then we must do so with respect to the insistence which Deleuze states is characteristic for conceptual personae in their formation. We already know that somehow, this insistence will be defined in terms of positional variance.

When we come to examine what has been referred to as ‘the fractal nature of photography,’ we will find that our shift away from the inherently semiological model employed by Husserl in the methodological form of phenomenology’s ‘imaginary variation’ has in fact placed us within a grammatical model of analysis; and at this point, we will be able to inquire more directly into the implications of productive functionality. But for now, we must first consider exactly how the productive functionalities we have been considering provide a sense of insistence to the formation of conceptual personae.

In Bacon’s paintings, Deleuze tells us that the ‘shadow’ he makes note of arises at a ‘localized point in the contour (of the body).” Interestingly, Leibniz describes such ‘localized points’ as constituting points-of-view; which, as we noted earlier, in turn produce subjectivities:

“A point of view is defined by this: a small number of singularities drawn from the curve of the world. This is what is at the basis of an individual notion. What makes the difference between you and me is that you are, on this kind of fictional curve, you are constructed around such and such singularities, and me around such and such singularities. And what you call individuality is a complex of singularities insofar as they form a point of view.”


> Figure 03-9b: Singular Musical Presences <

We might say, then, that this ‘shadow’ of which we have been speaking is the escape of individuality from its defining point-of-view: it is a differential consistency which defines a difference-in-kind; it is the occurrence of the singular upon a consistent horizon of event. With this concept of ‘shadow,’ we again find the same common ground being held between Barthes’ analysis of photography and Deleuze’s inquiry into the nature of Bacon’s paintings. In either case, we find the creation of an “other” which is not simply some form of representation, but, which has some essential spontaneity of its own. This productive separation from the representational
does indeed occur within the imaging spontaneity of consciousness; and as Sartre explains, this happens in a very distinct manner:

“The purely psychic ‘content’ of the mental image cannot escape this law: a consciousness that faces the thing that it aims at is a perceptual consciousness; a consciousness that aims emptily at the thing is a pure sign consciousness. This necessity for the matter of the mental image to be already constituted as an object for consciousness, I call the transcendence of the representative. But transcendence does not mean externality: it is the represented thing that is external, not its mental ‘analogon’. The illusion of immanence consists in transferring the externality, spatiality, and all the sensible qualities of the thing to the transcendent psychic content. It does not have these qualities: it represents them, but in its own way.”

Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Imaginary”; page 53.

We must say, then, that in occurring as mental image, The Photograph and The Figure acquire a transcendental aspect which functions “in its own way” for each. That we have such a distinct and determinable difference being established tells us that we are encountering a difference-in-kind. Further, if we are to take such occurrences of ‘transcendence’ in their most basic sense, we would have to say that we are working with what can only be described as an element of consistency which expresses an insistence. Taken together, these two components create a concept we have already encountered: that of an event-horizon. At this point, we can begin to note that the perspectival arcs Leibniz describes in terms of singularities united by points-of-view strongly imply that Sartre’s ‘mental images’ insist upon distinguishing themselves ‘in their own ways’ through consistencies we can call event horizons.

And although we have yet to establish how photography and painting each diverge upon their own distinct and separate way, we already have some familiarity with what these ‘ways’ would be composed through: they are of that spontaneity inherent within consciousness, the partiality of those structures which produce consciousness, the productive tendencies of those conceptual personae that ‘animate’ both photograph and viewer, without distinguishing between subject and object; all of which expresses a definite tendency toward an insistence which is functional in nature.

This is what we can in some instances call Reason; and it is what we would in other instances call ‘the taste of aesthetic judgement’: it is those distinct and distinguishable ways we place together singular elements in any compositional process. This is the functional nature of conceptual personae, defined in terms of production as horizon of event. As Deleuze and Guattari explain:

“Sartre’s presupposition of an impersonal transcendental field restores the rights of immanence. When immanence is no longer immanent to something other than itself it is possible to speak of a plane of immanence. Such a plane is, perhaps, a radical empiricism: it does not present a flux of the lived that is immanent to a subject and individualized in that which belongs to a self. It presents only events, that is, possible worlds as concepts, and other people as expressions of possible worlds or conceptual personae. The event does not relate the lived to a transcendental subject = Self but, on the contrary, is related to the immanent survey of a field without subject; the Other Person does not restore transcendence to an other self but returns every other self to the immanence of the field surveyed. Empiricism knows only events and other people and is therefore a great creator of concepts. Its force begins from the moment it defines
the subject: a habitus, a habit, nothing but a habit
in a field of immanence, the habit of saying I.”


> Figure 03-11a: Lead Vocalist As A Concept; INXS <

In other words, the establishment of a transcendental field
determines the nature of those “objects” which can then
be said to occur with reference to that transcendental field.
In this way, the transcendental field functions in the form
of a relativizing horizon of contextualization; and in the
movement of its coming into being, a transcendental field
functions as an event horizon relative to specific singularities
which form with it. This is to say, the transcendental field
comes into being even as diagrammatic features form of
immanence turning onto itself.

Thus we can say that conceptual personae constitute the
becoming of transcendental fields, wherein the specific,
singular “objects” which form are concepts; and that
‘becoming conceptual’ proceeds, through conceptual
personae, from a plane of immanence that is characterized
by diagrammatic features which are, in turn, formed of
localized positional variance. What can we say of this
plane of immanence, if not that: “It is from thought,
toward thought, starting from thought and always still
within thought, that thinking occurs.” Immanence, simply
said, is most clearly demonstrated in that event we call
‘thinking’; and any conceptual persona will function as
a transcendental field, as an apparitional ground for the
formation of concepts. This is something we shall have to
insist upon.

Here we see clarified the precise nature of Barthes’ “mad
image” of The Photograph as “shared hallucination”; here,
we find the character of that which Attends what Bacon
painted as The Figure: it is a positional variance which is
impersonal in nature, which occurs in the immanence of
survey, and which becomes compositional in the concept
by way of conceptual personae. It is the self-variance
of temporal events, a fractal difference-in-kind which
characterizes both the photographic and the conceptual
(although, each in their own way); it is the consistently
fragmented nature of the modern cogito.

The Photograph never says “I”, even when it is employed in
the production of personal portraits: The Photograph is an
event, a moment articulating between deterritorialization
and reterritorialization. Each photograph is a singular
point upon a diagrammatic arc we can call the event
horizon of photography. If we agree that The Photograph
occurs as do those orientations of survey which constitute
or lay out the prephilosophic plane of immanence, then
we also acknowledge that such orientations are distinctly
impersonal: they are as much positional variances of the
view as they are personal variances of the viewer. As Deleuze
describes:

“What is a transcendental field? It can be
distinguished from experience in that it doesn’t
refer to an object or belong to a subject (empirical
representation). It appears therefore as a pure
stream of a-subjective consciousness, a prereflexive
impersonal consciousness, a qualitative duration of
consciousness without a self. It may seem curious that
the transcendental be defined by such immediate
givens: we will speak of a transcendental empiricism
in contrast to everything that makes up the world of
the subject and the object. There is something wild
and powerful in this transcendental empiricism
that is of course not the element of sensation (simple
empiricism), for sensation is only a break within the
flow of absolute consciousness. It is, rather, however
close two sensations may be, a passage from one to
the other as becoming, as increase or decrease in
power (virtual quantity).”

Gilles Deleuze - “Immanence: A Life”; in: “Pure
Immanence: Essays on a life”; page 25.
Without any doubt, it is in the production of such an impersonal, transcendental field that we find the “beyond” of Barthes’ photographic *punctum* forming as a ‘shared hallucination.’ We must still ask, however, what this ‘beyond’ entails: are we encountering a transcendental field seemingly isolated from conceptual variation, as with Kant’s establishment of an independent sense for the dimensionality of time and space? Is this ‘beyond’ a commonality into which the photograph emerges; or, is it a consistency forming of “in betweens”?

At first glance, Deleuze’s exclusion of photography from the realm of productive conceptuality might suggest the former; yet, we have also seen how photography appears to situate itself in relation to those processes of survey which lay out the prephilosophical plane of immanence through diagrammatic features; and this implies the latter. We find this latter case implicated precisely in the “animation” that forms of photograph and viewer, in the spontaneous production of consciousness, in the diagrammatic relationship holding between The Photograph and whatever is produced, as the specific “event” of a mental image, through an encounter with consciousness. It may be expected, then, that we will have to consider the nature of photography in terms chosen to place an emphasis upon ‘event’; and, that only then will we be able to determine how the ‘event’ of The Photograph differs from ‘the event’ of any painting: which is to say, how each can distinctly constitute mental images through varying from their empirical occurrence, into, a transcendental appearance.

“Man, in the analytic of finitude, is a strange empirico-transcendental doublet, since he is a being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible.”

“For the threshold of our modernity is situated not by the attempt to apply objective methods to the study of man, but rather by the empirico-transcendental doublet which was called man.”

“It is the status of this true discourse that remains ambiguous. These two things lead to one conclusion: either this true discourse finds its foundation and model in the empirical truth whose genesis in nature and in history it retraces, so that one has an analysis of the positivist type (the truth of the object determines the truth of the discourse that describes its formation); or the true discourse anticipates the truth whose nature and history it defines; it sketches it out in advance and foments it from a distance, so that one has a discourse of the eschatological type (the truth of the philosophical discourse constitutes the truth in formation). In fact, it is a question not so much of an alternative as of a fluctuation inherent in all analysis, which brings out the value of the empirical at the transcendental level.”

Michel Foucault, “The Order of Things”; pages 347, 348-349.

> Figure 03-12a: Transcending Identity In A Band <

It would seem, then, that our answer to the question of how photography and painting diverge in the way they contribute to the production of concepts by conceptual persona lies within some variance in their respective oscillations between the empirical and the transcendental.

We have noted that photography can be located within territorialization, somewhere between The Earth and an encountering consciousness; that photography is a form of survey which can be directly implicated in laying out the prephilosophical plane of compositional immanence; that The Earth offers a horizon of differential consistency which can, in the case of photography, be taken as a horizon of event;
and that The Photograph, as the orientation of survey upon a prephilosophic plane of diagrammatic features, is thus by definition a singularity which becomes such relative to a horizon of event; that the relationship between photography and the prephilosophic plane is a fractal one; and that the fractal nature of photography can be defined in terms of a differential relationship holding between the singular nature of The Photograph and the unique nature of such punctum as can be found within individual photographs.

We noted that photography, in being positioned with respect to the prephilosophic plane where concepts are produced, must have some relationship with the conceptual personae who are responsible for creating concepts. We also noted that photography and conceptual personae appear to articulate with each other with respect to the way in which singularities are definitional of event horizons.

In taking note of such characteristics as we have been able to gather together for: photography, as exemplified by The Photograph; and the spontaneity of consciousness, as exemplified by conceptual personae, we have undertaken an analytic approach quite distinct from that of Husserl’s ‘imaginary variation.’ Instead of defining universals which occur as distinctly isolated ideals, we have assembled differential textures. We have not been considering those commonalities defining self-identity in the course of our analyses: we have been defining differences-in-kind, as determined through self-variances. This has allowed us to examine elements which are concurrent across the textures of distinct differences-in-kind; and it has shown us that such textures are, in the final analysis and within the finite boundaries of our knowledge, woven of experience. Thus we have come to the realization that the commonality of the transcendental field is, for our analytic purposes, best understood with reference to the singular consistency of an event horizon. By proceeding in this way, we can hope to better understand the differential relationships holding between photography, painting, and the production of philosophic concepts.

Bearing in mind, of course, that we shall each consciously take from our ‘minute perceptions’ of these differential textures that which is most clearly and distinctly related to our own individual experiences and conceptual needs; for in proceeding by way of a grammatological model, we must do so as a community of productive writers, rather than as a commonality of passive readers.

In one of the last essays he published, Deleuze remarked at length upon the relationships holding between those differential consistencies we have encountered in the form of transcendental fields, and, the occurrent nature of singularities:

> “The transcendental field is defined by a plane of immanence, and the plane of immanence by a life.”

> “A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through and that are measured by given lived objects: an immanent life carrying with it the events or singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects.

> “This indefinite life does not itself have moments, close as they may be to one another, but only between-times, between-moments; it doesn’t just come about or come after but offers the immensity of an empty time where one sees the event yet to come and already happened, in the absolute of an immediate consciousness.”

Gilles Deleuze; ‘Immanence: A Life’; pages 28-29 in “Pure Immanence.”

> Figure 03-13a: Steven ‘Jesse’ Bernstein <

If we consider life, individuality, in terms of a point-of-view which arcs through specific singular points; if we
consider such singular points as characteristic of shifts in said diagrammatic arcs; if such shifts are connected by an “in between” which, by the very virtue of that connectivity constitutes consistency; if that consistency is such that the ‘before’ and the ‘after’ which define temporal difference-in-kind still constitutes the continuity of an event; then we can see how concepts can emerge as if from singular points on an arc that forms the curvature defining specific moments for a conceptual persona formed as a transcendental field. We can see the concept emerging as if it were the very shadow of individuality, escaping somehow from the body in which it has arisen, and, hysterically tearing itself free of the pitiful meat from which it so springs forth:

“I see no possibility of defining science if one does not indicate something that is created by and in science. And, it happens that what is created by and in science, I’m not completely sure what it is, but not concepts properly speaking. The concept of creation has been much more linked to art than to science or to philosophy. What does a painter create? He creates lines and colors. That suggests that lines and colors are not givens, but are the product of a creation. What is given, quite possibly, one could always call a flow. It’s flows that are given, and creation consists in dividing, organizing, connecting flows in such a way that a creation is drawn or made around certain singularities extracted from flows.”

“In some ways, the philosopher is not someone who sings, but someone who screams. Each time that you need to scream, I think that you are not far from a kind of call of philosophy. What would it mean for the concept to be a kind of scream or a kind of form of scream? That’s what it means to need a concept, to have something to scream! We must find the concept of that scream. One can scream thousands of things. Imagine something that screams: “Well really, all that must have some kind of reason to be.” It’s a very simple scream. In my definition, the concept is the form of the scream, we immediately see a series of philosophers who would say, “yes, yes!” These are philosophers of passion, of pathos, distinct from philosophers of logos. For example, Kierkegaard based his entire philosophy on fundamental screams.”


> Figure 03-14a: Musical Screams; The Loon Choir <

In all of this, we can find both consistency and insistence being localized within a temporal sense of positional variance.

We know these arcs which connect point-of-view singularities as the ‘in betweens’ of ‘A LIFE.’ We know singularities as the diagrammatic features that define the prephilosophic plane of immanence; but we also know each in terms of their different kinds of functionalities. We can see specific curvatures of such arcs as conceptual personae; and we can trace their production of concepts to the singular points defining the shifts which constitute such curvatures: shifts which are diagrammatic features. We can also find specific examples of how Deleuze and Guattari used this approach for defining the production of concepts diagrammatically: in “A Thousand Plateaus” (pages 183 and 185, in the chapter “Year Zero: Faciality”); and, in “What Is Philosophy?” (page 56, as ‘a machinic portrait of Kant’).
We know that this approach is derived from an encounter with art: this is thoroughly documented in Deleuze’s “Logic Of Sensation.” We know that Deleuze had a different view of what defines the sciences, and of the kind of functionality which he and Guattari attributed to the sciences, in contrast to the elements of perception they attribute to the arts (“What Is Philosophy?”); and that both in turn differ from their understanding of what constitutes a concept.

Photography’s relationship to the production of concepts, and to post-structural philosophy, was never given any degree of close analysis by Deleuze. If we are to determine the possible nature of that relationship for ourselves, we now have every indication that the best place to begin such an analysis would be with a close look at the consistent nature of an element found in common between photography, painting, and conceptual personae: that of diagrammatic features.
Let’s now consider a little more closely the nature of diagrammatic features, which figure so prominently in our placement of photography within post-structural philosophy, and see if we can discern how they might contribute to the formation of conceptual personae.

Since our previous analysis has indicated that photography most properly belongs with the pre-philosophic plane where diagrammatic features form; since Deleuze’s analysis of Francis Bacon’s paintings closely considers the use of diagrammatic features; and since conceptual personae draw upon diagrammatic features in producing those intensive features which ground the intensive ordinates used in the creation of concepts, it seems quite probable that a better understanding of the nature of such diagrammatic features will allow us to more accurately assess the interrelationships found holding, within a post-structural context, between photography, painting, and conceptual structures.

Deleuze has a particular vision of how diagrammatic features are employed in the process of painting:

“There would thus be a tempered use of the diagram, a kind of middle way in which the diagram is not reduced to the state of a code, and yet does not cover the entire painting, avoiding both the code and its scrambling.... Must we then speak of wisdom or classicism? It is hard to believe, however, that Cezanne followed a middle way. Rather, he invented a specific way, distinct from the two preceding ones. Few painters have produced the experience of chaos and catastrophe as intensely, while fighting to limit and control it at any price. Chaos and catastrophe imply the collapse of all the figurative givens, and thus they already entail a fight, the fight against the cliché, the preparatory work (all the more necessary in that we are no longer “innocent”). It is out of chaos that the “stubborn geometry” or “geologic lines” first emerge; and this geometry or geology must in turn pass through the catastrophe in order for color to arise, for the earth to rise toward the sun.”

Gilles Deleuze, “The Logic of Sensation”; page 111.

As noted earlier, for Deleuze philosophy is the art of grasping some small measure of consistency from the chaotic; to create concepts is to derive some continuity from a situation where connectivity has been otherwise rendered impossible. Thus we see the ‘geologic lines’ Deleuze speaks of, being produced out of chaos - as are concepts. Already, we see hints forming of the “geophilosophy” and “conceptual personae” that figure so prominently in “What Is Philosophy?”; but for now, let us focus on the occurrence of diagrammatic features.

In whatever way the use of diagrammatic features is ‘tempered,’ we must note that the end result is singular in that it produces specificity, rather than universality. So, our immediate concern rests primarily upon the way in which such ‘tempering’ occurs, and with the singular nature of that which this produces.

It should be noted here that we are not simply engaging with an alternative to universality: in fact, with the singular, we have left universality behind. So, whether we speak of a ‘middle way’ in which the use of diagrammatic features is tempered from the extremes of their occurrence; or of any specific way that distinguishes itself from all other approaches: we are in any case speaking of a determined way which is quite distinct from the generalities one finds defining universality:
"This great mathematical discovery is that singularity is no longer thought in relation to the universal, but is thought rather in relation to the ordinary or to the regular. The singular is what exceeds the ordinary and the regular. And saying that already takes us a great distance since saying it indicates that, henceforth, we wish to make singularity into a philosophical concept, even if it means finding reasons to do so in a favorable domain, namely mathematics. And in which case does mathematics speak to us of the singular and the ordinary? The answer is simple: concerning certain points plotted on a curve. Not necessarily on a curve, but occasionally, or more generally concerning a figure. A figure can be said quite naturally to include singular points and others that are regular or ordinary. Why a figure? Because a figure is something determined! So the singular and the ordinary would belong to the determination, and indeed, that would be interesting! You see that by dint of saying nothing and marking time, we make a lot of progress. Why not define determination in general, by saying that it’s a combination of singular and ordinary, and all determination would be like that? Perhaps?"

"I hold onto the following formula: a singularity is a distinct or determined point on a curve, it’s a point in the neighborhood of which the differential relation changes its sign, and the singular point’s characteristic is to extend [prolonger] itself into the whole series of ordinary points that depend on it all the way to the neighborhood of subsequent singularities. So I maintain that the theory of singularities is inseparable from a theory or an activity of extension <prolongement>. Wouldn’t these be elements for a possible definition of continuity? I’d say that continuity or the continuous is the extension <prolongement> of a remarkable point onto an ordinary series all the way into the neighborhood of the subsequent singularity. With this, I’m very pleased because at last, I have an initial hypothetical definition of what the continuous is. It’s all the more bizarre since, in order to reach this definition of the continuous, I used what apparently introduces a discontinuity, notably a singularity in which something changes. And rather than being the opposite, it’s the discontinuity that provides me with this approximate definition."


> Figures 04-2a and 2b: The Singular Trace of Time <

Diagrammatic features are singular in nature; and as such, they are determinate of figures. Thus we might well say that singular points determine a figure; and that such determination is made by way of diagrammatic features which turn back upon themselves; that is to say, that are immanent to themselves, that exhibit self-variance, that positionally localize change and so determine specific contours.

Sartre dedicates a considerable amount of analysis to such figures as these “diagrammatic features” singularly define, during the exposition of his text “The Imaginary.” Therein, he considers at length how consciousness engages with those rudimentary marks he calls “schema”: that is, simple line drawings which we all too easily identify as one thing or another. We should note that these schema are themselves of a ‘middle way,’ of an ‘in between,’ and so present an insistence we might call ‘tempered demands’ that ‘modulate’ the production of concepts:

“It is characteristic of the schema that it is intermediate between the image and the sign. Its matter demands to be deciphered. It aims only to present relations. By itself it is nothing.”
“Through these black lines we aim not just at a silhouette, we aim at a complete man, we concentrate in them all his qualities without differentiation: the schema is full to bursting. To tell the truth, these qualities are not represented; in the proper sense, the black features do not represent anything but some relations of structure and attitude. But it is enough of a rudiment of representation for all the knowledge to be weighted down there, thus giving a kind of depth to this flat figure.”

“The majority of schematic drawings are read in a definite sense. Eye movements organize the perception, carve out the spatial environment, determine the fields of force, transform the lines into vectors.”


> Figure 04-3a: Response To Diagrammatic Features <

It is important to note here how very much we bring to such simple diagrammatic features as these “schema”: often, only a few basic marks, in proper position and proportion (as ratio), are sufficient to invoke a very complex mental image that is complete with all its attendant, experiential subtleties of thought. In other words, we find that the singular points established by diagrammatic features determine the compositional continuity of a schema or figure. Clearly, the diagrammatic features that schema are composed from invoke a productive aspect of consciousness which demands to, which insists upon ‘transforming lines into vectors.’ This certainly sounds like the process through which diagrammatic features are shifted into intensive features, before being incorporated as intensive ordinates into the production of concepts.

Of greater interest to us here is that Sartre states such simple marks as schema, these basic contour composites of singular diagrammatic features, are not yet representational in nature. Rather, the images that they invoke are actively produced through sensation: that is, through the process of tracing with movements of the eye the dynamic vectors determined by the singular points of these schematic drawings. Thus, we might say that such schema temper the otherwise free and random movements of eyes that are engaged in a process of survey: schema localize positional variances effected by the eyes.

What is beginning to sound a little odd, though, is the hint of a suggestion that somehow, we are going to have to explain what is starting to seem like a necessary relationship between eye movement and conceptual personae. It is all very well and good to say that the diagrammatic features which constitute the plane of immanence are laid out in a process of survey; but to suggest that eye movements somehow determined the nature of conceptual personae sounds a bit strange.

> Figure 04-3b: Time And Movement <

Still; the text by Sartre that we are referring to is subtitled “A phenomenological psychology of the imagination”; and there is in fact a substantial and growing body of clinical research which correlates eye movement with mental imagery. In fact, it has been demonstrated that there is a direct correlation between eye movement during the REM phase of sleep, and the imagery occurring within dreams during this state:

“Our eyes swivel restlessly in their sockets during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep - a phenomenon that has escaped explanation for decades... According to a study in the June (2010) issue of Brain, the most likely explanation is that our eyes orient their gaze to scan the imagery of our dreams - just as eyes change their gaze in response to our environment when we are awake and moving around.”
“Arnulf and her colleagues used electrodes to track the eye movements of 56 sleep disorder subjects and 17 normal sleepers, simultaneously videotaping their nocturnal behaviours. The researchers analyzed the nighttime footage of the patients frame by frame to see if their actions and gazes matched up.

“And evidently they do. For 90 percent of the time, the gaze of a person with REM sleep disorder synchronized with mimed dream action... A(nother) participant who dreamed of climbing a ladder shifted his gaze up and down repeatedly to check his progress. Still another glanced over his shoulder as he ran from imaginary lions. If rapid eye movements were truly random twitches, then they would not match their accompanying dream actions so frequently, the researchers concluded.”

“(Subjects with REM sleep behaviour disorder do not enter the standard state of temporary paralysis that prevents any flailing about during dreams. Instead they physically act out their dreams: they kick, scream, grab, reach, climb, and jump, enabling researchers to observe what normally remains inside a dreamer’s head.)”

Ferris Jabr, Scientific American ‘News Scan,’ August 2010; page 22.

One cannot help but be impressed by the accuracy of Sartre’s philosophic investigation into the nature of consciousness as imagination. Half a century later, we find scientific evidence in support of his thesis that ‘eye movement tracing’ is directly implicated in the formation of mental imagery; and we find that this is true even down to the very threshold at which consciousness is produced as a spontaneity. Indeed, the last two decades have produced a wealth of scientific information concerning what Sartre might call the nonthetic processes which inform consciousness with visual imagery.

So at this point in our analysis, we are forced to concede that there is a necessary correlation between ‘eye movement tracing’ and the productive spontaneity of consciousness which produces mental imagery. In effect, it seems that the spontaneous self-variance of consciousness is directly involved in any singular production of schema as mental image, by way of positional variances localized within diagrammatic features. To the extent that concepts are products of consciousness’s spontaneity, we must agree that in all probability it does make sense to speak of such production in terms of surveying diagrammatic features; and suddenly, the idea that a “logic of sensation” might be implicit in the production of concepts by the spontaneity of imaging consciousness is beginning to sound quite likely.

One fairly recent study has produced an exceptionally bizarre confirmation of just how integral ‘eye movement tracing’ is within our ability to discern the most basic diagrammatic features of visual imagery:

“Opponency is ubiquitous in physiology. For example, to bend your arm, you relax your triceps while contracting your biceps; biceps and triceps are opponent muscles, in that they act in direct opposition to each other. In 1872 German physiologist Ewald Hering suggested that color vision was based on opponency between red and green and between yellow and blue; at each spot in the visual field, the redness and greenness muscles, so to speak, opposed each other.”

“The observation that people never see mixtures of opponent colors has been one of the most secure in cognitive science.”

“In 1983, however, Hewitt D. Crane and Thomas P. Piantanida of SRI International in Menlo Park, Calif., reported a way to dodge the perceptual...
rules that forbid such colors as reddish green and yellowish blue. They had their subjects look at side-by-side fields of red and green or yellow and blue. Their apparatus tracked their subjects’ eye positions and moved mirrors to keep the color fields stabilized - that is, frozen in place on each subject’s retina despite all the continual little movements of the eye. Image stabilization can lead to many interesting effects, such as an image seeming to break into pieces that wax and wane in visibility. Of particular interest to Crane and Piantanida was the propensity for borders to fade in stabilized images.”

“When subjects stare at two adjacent fields with equiluminant colors, they see the border between the colors weaken and disappear, allowing the colors to flow into each other - except in the case of red-green or yellow-blue pairs. We knew that this border-collapse effect is strongest when the observer minimizes eye movements. Perhaps the effects of equiluminance and stabilization would combine synergistically, leading to border collapse and color mixing powerful enough to happen consistently even with opponent colors.”

“...The combination of equiluminance and image stabilization was remarkably effective. For the equiluminant images, six out of our seven observer’s saw forbidden colors (the seventh observer’s vision grayed out immediately every time). The border between the two colors would vanish, and the colors would flow across the border and mix.”

Vincent A. Billock and Brian H. Tsou, “Seeing Forbidden Colors”; Scientific American, February 2010; pages 72, 73, 74, 75.

> Figure 04-5a and 5b: Hiding In Plain Sight <

The phenomenological results of these visual experiments sound to be about as far from the cliché as one could ever possibly go; and, to be so far so as to be pretty much smack dab in the middle of the most hysterical madness conceivable. It is difficult to even begin to imagine existing in a conscious state where every normally distinct and distinguishable outline and contour flow into each other, mixing together everything otherwise discernible. I suppose that would be the reverse corollary for Sartre’s “illusion of immanence”; whereby, instead of physical objects appearing to retain their properties as mental images, the pure immanence of consciousness would be imparted into the perceptual appearance of physical objects. It is debatable as to whether consciousness itself could retain any degree of stability if the spontaneity of its occurrence were so completely untempered; although one must also consider that consciousness consistently proves itself to be extraordinarily malleable and exceedingly adaptive. One must wonder, though, how resilient the consistency of conceptual formations would be in the experiential face of such chaotic immanence.

It is difficult to see any advantage within an evolutionary context for a sense which would render that which is perceivable, instead, indistinct and indistinguishable. After all, the entire advantage conveyed by the senses is that of making different things distinguishable from each other; so much so that an evolutionary countertrend is readily demonstrable, in which organisms have evolved camouflage markings which make them difficult to discern in their natural environments.

Thus, there are certainly grounds upon which to question the exclusion of photography from post-structural philosophy: it may be that photography, in its reliance upon ratios of resemblance, is not as directly productive of the conceptual as painting can be; but at the other extreme, excluding resemblance and ratio from imaging consciousness does not appear to be a conceptually viable alternative course of action.
In producing diagrammatic features, each in its own way, both photography and painting must be capable of contributing to the production of concepts by conceptual persona. Our task now is to define that difference between these respective ways.

And if nothing else, we can at least conclude that Sartre was indeed correct in his assessment of the very important role played by ‘eye movement tracing’ in the formation of our imaging consciousness; still bearing in mind, of course, that ‘diagrammatic features’ need not, in the broadest sense of their definition, be visual in nature: they need only be of immanence, as something folded back upon itself, in the context of a self-variance which is distinctly territorializing in nature.

Two Eventualities Diverge

To continue with Sartre:

“There are two eventualities: in one, we affect free eye movements without an ulterior motive and we consider the contours of the spot at our pleasure, following the order that pleases us and bringing together at random this and that part in a synthesis that nothing demands or rejects... That is to say that, on this freely effected synthesis, I make an hypothesis: I confer a representative value on the oriented form that has just appeared. To tell the truth, most of the time, I do not wait until the synthesis is completed, but, suddenly something crystallizes at the beginning of the image... Knowledge has been incorporated in my movements and directs them: now I know how I must finish the operation, I know what I must find.”

Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Imaginary”; page 36.

The second eventuality, in which an image suddenly crystallizes at the beginning of its conscious apprehension within a compositional synthesis, is very characteristic of the kind of ‘clichéd response to representation’ which Deleuze and other post-structural philosophers so thoroughly critique. This is the kind of conceptual act which is characteristic of reterritorialization. It is also characteristic of those nonthetic processes which are dedicated toward specific forms of visual cognition. Distinct neural sites have been identified that selectively process: faces; objects; and locations (by characteristic relations between distinguishable landmarks):

“Similar functional imaging studies have confirmed the existence of separate areas dedicated respectively to the perception of faces and places. For example, Nancy Kanwisher at MIT has identified a ‘face area’ which she named FFA (fusiform face area), which is activated much more by pictures of faces than by other pictures such as everyday objects, buildings, or even scrambled pictures of faces. This area is quite separate from another area (PPA - parahippocampal place area) which is activated by pictures of buildings and scenes, but much less by faces. Yet another area has been identified which relates to everyday objects (like fruit, cups, TV sets and vases).”

“The critical areas for colors, faces, and places are located close together on the underside of the brain near the junction of the occipital and temporal lobes, combining to form a region, along with area LO, more on the lateral surface, that constitutes most of the human equivalent of the monkey’s ventral stream. Although the degree of overlap among the different areas remains controversial, there is no doubting their separate existence. The brain imaging experiments and the clinical studies both point to one undeniable conclusion: our perceptual
experience is not the product of a general purpose object recognition system but is instead the creation of a set of quasi-independent visual modules.

“This cluster of visual areas on the underside of the temporal lobes seems to house most of the machinery that underlies our perceptual experience.”

David Milner and Melvin Goodale, “Sight Unseen”; pages 60, 62.

Since there are distinct neurological areas of the brain which process identifiable kinds of visual patterns, there are also distinct patterns of mental imagery arising as our conscious awareness from these nonthetic processes. Thus we must realize that we are never dealing with a simple correlation between ‘eye movement tracing’ of discernible, diagrammatic contours (such as the singular features of schema) and the direct perception of visual form: the mental imagery of our visual consciousness is actively produced through a variety of neurological processes functionally dedicated toward creating consciousness from its current point-of-view. The degree to which consciousness is actively produced through imagination thus figures prominently in the debate over how much freedom we have in our experience of consciousness as uniquely productive, or as habitually representational.

One of the representational tendencies which Deleuze and Guattari critique most thoroughly (that of “faciality”) in fact corresponds to the functional nature of one specific neural process for visual cognition:

> Figure 04-7a: Facial Recognition <

“It is not the individuality of the face that counts but the efficacy of the ciphering it makes possible, and in what cases it makes it possible. This is an affair not of ideology but of economy and the organization of power (pouvoir). We are certainly not saying that the face, the power of the face (la puissance du visage), engenders and explains social power (pouvoir). Certain assemblages of power (pouvoir) require the production of a face, others do not. If we consider primitive societies, we see that there is very little that operates through the face: their semiotic is nonsignifying, nonsubjective, essentially collective, polyvocal and corporeal, playing on very diverse forms and substances. This polyvocality operates through bodies, their volumes, their internal cavities, their variable exterior connections and coordinates (territorialities).”


> Figure 04-7b: Seeing Things Which Are Not There <

Although Deleuze and Guattari could not have been aware of the role played in facial recognition by distinct neural processes, they nonetheless raised very pertinent questions with regard to the functional relationships holding between nonthetic processes and conscious awareness. It is particularly interesting that the semiotic mechanisms outlined here are functioning much as the ‘lateral irreal spontaneities’ of Sartre: it is not ‘otherness’ which is established and reacted to, but a variant sameness to which
is attributed some manner of ‘negative influence’ over the self, or over some socially defined group with which ‘the self’ identifies.

And there are of course definite instances wherein the neural processes underpinning faciality do produce that distinct form of conscious spontaneity whereby a sense of self, as other to itself, emerges; as when, for instance, the deeply religious see the face of their deity appearing for them upon various randomly mottled surfaces (such as food they have cooked). It is interesting that Deleuze and Guattari took the example of faciality to be characteristic of ‘the domination of the signifier’; for clearly, this is an example where the spontaneity of consciousness has been divided from itself by an imposition of ‘meaning.’ In such cases, meaning has been imposed, by way of representation, upon otherwise ‘free, involuntary marks’ randomly occurring upon a variable surface; and therefore, the nature of the representation so postulated as objectively existing instead comes exclusively from those subjective encounters within experience through which knowledge of the representation is acquired as something taught within a social context; and this means, by way of a transcendental field.

In a clinical context, there does seem to be a neurological basis for this rather strange interplay between visual cognition and semiological attribution: it has been demonstrated that the neurology which processes the visual recognition of faces, places, and objects tends to be localized within one dominant hemisphere of the brain; while the corresponding location in the opposite hemisphere is dominated by neurology dedicated toward the semiological processing of linguistic occurrences. Without a doubt, there is an oscillation between these differentially functional aspects of our brain’s neurology underlying this particular instance of what Foucault referred to as the strange ‘empirico-transcendental’ status of our modern cogito; and here, we are pushing our inquiry into thought well past the point where “thinking” no longer occurs.

Note also that Sartre places the process of orientation before that of representation. This is of interest, for we have already established that the process of resemblance which initially occurs in photography as ‘Ratio’ is most definitely related to orientation; and, as Deleuze indicated earlier, this precedes representation.

And indeed, Sartre has himself outlined how concepts are formed through the consideration of diagrammatic features occurring in the form of schema:

> Figure 04-8a: Real And Imagined Features <

Whatever else one might wish to say of photography, nothing demonstrates its separation from painting and from the spontaneity of consciousness more clearly than the fact that taking a photograph of marks which seem to form such pareidolic images does not make them more readily apparent to other people. Painting what they seem to suggest, however, does. Thus, we must conclude: the resemblances instituted through photography are established by way of Ratio, not ideology.

The first eventuality that Sartre describes is of a little more interest to us here. This process of free eye movement and random conscious consideration seems very much in keeping with the general process that Deleuze describes as characterizing the occurrence of diagrammatic features upon a plane of immanence, and in the production of transcendental fields that proceeds from the survey of such diagrammatic features. We are here of course dealing with the spontaneity of consciousness; and we can easily see how such transcendental fields can in their production imply a creative horizon of event best described in terms of conceptual personae.

“But it is very evident that the comprehension is realized in and by the construction. The structure of the concept to be comprehended serves as a rule for the elaboration of the schema and one becomes
conscious of this rule by the very fact of applying it. So that, once the schema is constructed, there remains nothing more to comprehend.”

Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Imaginary”; page 103.

> Figure 04-9a: Diagrammatic Silhouettes <

Here, then, is a very original description of how concepts are produced of diagrammatic features, as encountered in the form of visual schema. The realization of these diagrammatic features as schema is, in fact, the production of a concept: and it is a singular production, effected not by a universally ideal cogito, but by some “fragmentary imaging symbolic system” functioning within the nonthetic activities of consciousness that Sartre describes so well. This is certainly consistent with the productive activities of any specific conceptual persona. Here we would say that conceptual personae are of a singular intermediacy tempering the production of concepts from diagrammatic features; or if you prefer, that singular points defining arcs which eye movements trace actively produce conceptual structures through the spontaneity of consciousness. We have encountered such a shift into ‘presencing’ before: in the hysteria that Attends to mediate The Figure in Bacon’s paintings; and in that ‘in between’ of positional variance which makes The Photograph a “mad image” for Barthes.

“Next, and especially, it is enough to produce in oneself one of these schemas and as observer to note that they do not at all have this role of sign and representative. Without doubt, there is in the schema a representative: it is the affective-motor analogon through which we apprehend the shape and its color. But the schema itself is an analogon no more: it is itself an object having a sense... We reach here the true sense of the symbolic schema: this schema is the object of our thought giving itself to our consciousness. Thus the function of the schema as such is not at all to aid comprehension; it functions neither as expression nor as support nor as exemplification. I willingly say, using an indispensable neologism, that the role of the schema is as presentifier.”

Jean-Paul Sartre, “The Imaginary”; page 105.

The schema functions through immanence; it is thought constituting itself in order to give itself to itself: as diagrammatic features, through the sensation of eye movements tracing contours, consciousness varies from itself by spontaneously creating itself as something which differs from itself.

Here again, we see Sartre outlining those very traits which Deleuze demands of that productive functionality he insistently defines as characteristic of conceptual personae, starting with ‘The Figure’ of Bacon’s paintings and developing into the ‘rhythmic characters’ grounding conceptual personae. It is here that we can find that pivotal point where ‘the empirical’ shifts into ‘the transcendental,’ and in such a way as to give us that conceptuality which characterizes the imaginary.

It is not by coincidence that the concept of conceptual personae was developed by Deleuze in part through his encounter with the paintings of Francis Bacon. The singular works of Bacon altered the trajectory of Deleuze’s philosophic development, and created very specific curvatures of conceptual immanence which produced those changes in direction that Deleuze’s inquiries subsequently took. These differential curvatures, as conceptual components, would not have been produced by an encounter with photography.

For, the concept of conceptual personae does not emerge from the fact that the eye traces the contours of diagrammatic features: in evolutionary biology, any creature with a lower jaw also has eyes with that ability; but, as far as
we can tell, no other creatures on this planet are as prone to
the production of concepts as we consistently seem to be. No,
what distinguishes the finitude of Man, what circumscribes
our human nature, what allows the creation of conceptual
personae capable of producing concepts from diagrammatic
features, is the simple fact that we have hands which can
define contours for our eyes to trace:

“It is like the emergence of another world.
For these marks, these traits, are irrational,
involuntary, accidental, free, random. They are
nonrepresentative, nonillustrative, nonnarrative.
They are no longer either significant or signifiers:
they are asignifying traits. They are traits of
sensation, but of confused sensations (the confused
sensations, as Cezanne said, that we bring with us
at birth). And above all, they are manual traits. It is
here that the painter works with a rag, stick, brush,
or sponge; it is here that he throws the paint with
his hands.”

Gilles Deleuze, “The Logic of Sensation”; page 100.

The diagram, Deleuze tells us, is not in fact an optical
construct; it is instead a manual production. Here, it is
the productive activity of the hand which tempers the
movements of the eye; and in doing so, it is through the
actions of our hands that we create the image of our human
world:

“The diagram is thus the operative set of asignifying
and nonrepresentative lines and zones, linestrokes
and color-patches. And the operation of the diagram,
its function, says Bacon, is to be “suggestive.”
Or, more rigorously, to use language similar to
Wittgenstein’s, it is to introduce “possibilities of
fact.” Because they are destined to give us the
Figure, it is all the more important for the traits and
color-patches to break with figuration. This is why
they are not sufficient in themselves, but must be
“utilized.” They mark out possibilities of fact, but
do not yet constitute a fact (the pictorial fact). In
order to be converted into a fact, in order to evolve
into a Figure, they must be reinjected into the visual
whole; but it is precisely through the action of these
marks that the visual whole will cease to be an
optical organization; it will give the eye another
power, as well as an object that will no longer be
figurative.”

Gilles Deleuze, “The Logic of Sensation”; page 101.

At this point, we have left photography far behind; for,
the mechanical processes through which the photographic
image is produced are not inherently dependent upon any
direct manipulation by the hands. Still, neither are concepts;
so until we establish exactly how the conceptual fits into all
of this, we remain uncertain as to the exact place best suited
for photography within post-structural philosophy. We know
of course that conceptual personae seem dependent upon
‘eye movement tracing’ in their production of concepts: we
might say here that as our eyes trace diagrammatic features,
so conceptual personae trace consistency to outline concepts.
Similarly, in the ‘free’ and ‘nonrepresentational’ marks
employed by Bacon in his paintings, the means are provided
for a spontaneous ‘making’ synonymous with productive
conceptuality: conceptual personae are given hands, in
the sense of acquiring the ability to freely trace conceptual
consistencies.

Now, we finally have a basis upon which we can define an
absolute distinction between painting in general, and any
photograph: paintings are always produced through manual
devices, while photographs are produced entirely through
mechanical processes. Clearly, there is a very basic and irrevocable disjunction between painting and photography. Yet even here, in the face of such an absolutely certain differentiation, we still have grounds to suspect the existence of some as yet unrealized commonality holding between these two art forms. Deleuze notes:

“The diagram always has effects that go beyond it. As an unbridled manual power, the diagram dismantles the optical world, but at the same time, it must be reinjected into the visual whole, where it introduces a properly haptic world and gives the eye a haptic function.

Gilles Deleuze, “The Logic of Sensation”; page 138.

In the ‘beyond’ of the diagram, we find an echo of that “beyond” which Barthes discovered extending from the positionality which defines the photographic punctum.

And consistently, we have found that photography has the ability to reinsert itself into the visual processes of painting.

It is possible, then, that there is some sense in which photography partakes of what Deleuze termed ‘a properly haptic world,’ even though it does not do so by way of the hand’s manual intervention within the optical function of the eye.

This being the case, we should now consider more closely such a haptic function, in order that we might better understand how photography could influence the eye’s optical function without intervening by way of the hand’s manual capabilities.
Nomadism

In coming to grips with how painting may be productive of the conceptual in a way not exhibited by photography, we found that it is the hand’s ability to create singular contours for the eye to trace which so distinguishes painting from photography. We have also found that there is a specific term for this relationship between hand and eye: the haptic function, which determines a properly haptic space.

What is this haptic function, and how can we define it?

“Finally, we will speak of the haptic whenever there is no longer a strict subordination in either direction, either a relaxed subordination or a virtual connection, but when sight discovers in itself a specific function of touch that is uniquely its own, distinct from its optical function. One might say that painters paint with their eyes, but only insofar as they touch with their eyes.”

Gilles Deleuze, “The Logic of Sensation”; page 155.

This very much suggests that the haptic function corresponds to motor reflex activations effected by the eyes, but, produced through tracings initiated by the hands. This approach certainly does allow us to make a little more sense of what had earlier seemed to be quite a strange proposition: that ‘eye movement tracing’ somehow produces conceptual personae. Instead, we might now wish to consider the possibility that conceptual personae are in some way made, or constructed, as is anything else the hands produce. Deleuze is quite clear on this point:

“Everything is now brought into the clear, a clarity greater than that of the contour and even of light. The words Leiris uses to describe Bacon - hand, touch, seizure, capture - evoke this direct manual activity that traces the possibility of the fact: we will capture the fact, just as we will “seize hold of life.” But the fact itself, this pictorial fact that has come from the hand, is the formation of a third eye, a haptic eye, a haptic vision of the eye, this new clarity. It is as if the duality of the tactile and the optical were surpassed visually in this haptic function born of the diagram.”

Gilles Deleuze, “The Logic of Sensation”; page 161.

> Figure 05-1a: Inscribed Images On Rock <

I must confess, the notion of a Deleuzean ‘third eye’ does conjure up visions of post-structural acolytes professing haptic enlightenment of an almost religious order; so perhaps, in reference to the quote that began this inquiry, we must concede the possibility that philosophy might be capable of slipping a notch or two below even “commercial professional training,” with regard to how the creation of concepts is approached. But I digress in this; and we shall instead take such a haptic function to be indicative of a transcendental field’s formation: a field defined by dimensions not of space and time but, of touch and sight. Where we might have thought earlier in the work undertaken by Deleuze and Guattari of a “Body Without Organs,” by the time they produced the text “What Is Philosophy?” we find ourselves thinking of such subjectless transcendental fields in terms of conceptual personae.

Here, Deleuze considers the haptic function to be inherent within vision but, in such a way as to be somehow functionally characteristic of actions undertaken by the hands. Elsewhere, Deleuze and Guattari note one very specific type of occurrence relative to the hands which does eventually implicate conceptual personae; and it is a relationship which we have previously considered at length:
“It seems to us that a social field comprises structures and functions, but this does not tell us very much directly about particular movements that affect the Socius. We already know the importance in animals of those activities that consist in forming territories, in abandoning or leaving them, and even in re-creating territory on something of a different nature (ethologists say that an animal's partner or friend is the “equivalent of a home” or that the family is a “mobile territory”). All the more so for the hominid: from its act of birth, it deterritorializes its front paw, wrests it from the earth to turn it into a hand, and reterritorializes it on branches and tools. A stick is, in turn, a deterritorialized branch. We need to see how everyone, at every age, in the smallest things as in the greatest challenges, seeks a territory, tolerates or carries out deterritorialization, and is reterritorialized on almost anything - memory, fetish, or dream...

“We cannot even say what comes first, and perhaps every territory presupposes a prior deterritorialization, or everything happens at the same time. Social fields are inextricable knots in which the three movements are mixed up so that, in order to disentangle them, we have to diagnose real types or personae... We believe that psychosocial types have this meaning: to make perceptible, in the most insignificant or most important circumstances, the formation of territories, the vectors of deterritorialization, and the process of reterritorialization.”

“The role of conceptual personae is to show thought's territories, its absolute deterritorializations and reterritorializations. Conceptual persona are thinkers, solely thinkers, and their personalized features are closely linked to the diagrammatic features of thought and the intensive features of concepts. A particular conceptual persona, who perhaps did not exist before us, thinks in us.”


We might almost be tempted to say that the very fact of our hands having functionally deterritorialized from being forepaws has made us human; insofar as, this has led through a very long and contingent evolution toward our ability to territorialize even our own thought, through the use of conceptual structures. In developing the ability to make things with our hands, we acquired the capability for creating things within our minds; and there appears to be a decidedly haptic aspect to the territorializations effected through the imaging consciousness which resulted from our hands’ interactions with our eyes.

With this insight, we have to pause momentarily in thought; for, as we noted earlier, those processes which are implicitly of territorialization are also inherently a part of photography. If such processes of territorialization define conceptual personae, then perhaps there is something of the haptic function that Deleuze describes which might be as inclined toward photography as it is toward painting.

And indeed, there is much more to this haptic function than that which is simply painted or drawn. The haptic function also defines the nature of an experiential space, a variable positionality which consists of shifting orientations within the field of visual survey. It is as if, in moving beyond what simple vision produces, the haptic function has opened entirely new vistas; it is as if the haptic function carries both vision and touch where neither could go without it, either separately or together: the haptic function is itself territorializing of a haptic space.

> Figure 05-2a: Images As Territorial Markings <
“The first aspect of the haptic, smooth space of close vision is that its orientations, landmarks, and linkages are in continuous variation; it operates step by step. Examples are the desert, steppe, ice, and sea, local spaces of pure connection. Contrary to what is sometimes said, one never sees from a distance in a space of this kind, nor does one see it from a distance; one is never “in front of,” any more than one is “in” (one is “on”...). Orientations are not constant but change according to temporary vegetation, occupations, and precipitation. There is no visual model for points of reference that would make them interchangeable and unite them in an inertial class assignable to an immediate outside observer. On the contrary, they are tied to any number of observers, who may be qualified as “monads” but are instead nomads entertaining tactile relations among themselves. The interlinkages do not imply an ambient space in which the multiplicity would be immersed and which would make distances invariant; rather, they are constituted according to ordered differences that give rise to intrinsic variations in the division of a single distance. These questions of orientation, location, and linkage enter into play in the most famous works of nomad art: the twisted animals have no land beneath them; the ground constantly changes direction, as in aerial acrobatics; the paws point in the opposite direction from the head. The hind part of the body is turned upside down; the “monadological” points of view can be interlinked only on a nomad space; the whole and the parts give the eye that beholds them a function that is haptic rather than optical. This is an animality that can be seen only by touching it with one’s mind, but without the mind becoming a finger, not even by way of the eye.”


Here, it is obviously not the case that the hand is tracing out imaginary variations for eye movements to follow. These spatial variations of orientation are distinctly positional in nature. These are experiential variations realized through an ‘in between,’ during a process of survey effected by physically traversing a space.

This should not surprise us, although it is surprising that neither Deleuze nor Guattari appear to have explored the implications of this point. Perhaps this must be expected, though: Deleuze was certainly never one inclined toward hiking in wilderness areas; and as the saying goes, ‘the map is not the territory.’ In living our lives almost entirely immersed within cityscapes of artifice, we simply do not encounter much of anything beyond what has resulted from the thoughts of others. The demand for thinking new thoughts loses its imperative nature within such environments, which makes the work undertaken through post-structural philosophy all the more important.

We should therefore bear in mind that the initial forms of encounter which forced thought to develop its inherently productive nature were of stratagem, not artifice: we became thinkers in seeking to safely traverse the perils of wild landscapes, not in tracing our way along the regularities of urban landscapes. Without doubt, it is true that the use of our hands in productive activities is a characteristically human trait; but it is equally true that the manipulative actions of our hands rests upon our bipedal stature; and if our hands provided answers to the most pressing questions our species faced in the course of our evolutionary development, the questions themselves were raised in relation to where our feet were taking us. Our ability to think formed somewhere between our hands and our feet.
It may be true that our capacity for imaginative variation rests within the manipulative grasp of our hands, even if simply through an ability to turn objects over and about for immediate inspection; but, it would be equally true that our sense of positional variation springs from the ambulant activities of our feet.

Thus, there is always within our imaginative abilities something which is neither the positional variation found through ambulant activities, nor the manual variation formed of our grasping hands: instead, thought occurs as if an ‘in between’ which composes itself of differentials that form from separate and distinct types of variation. It seems logical to conclude that, if the actions of our hands can define one kind of haptic space within which the eye can imaginatively trace contours and outlines, then, another form of haptic space might be composed through positional variations effected for our eyes by the ambulant actions of our feet.

> Figure 05-4a: The Concept of Territory <

The “haptic eye” must be defined by differential relationships which are considerably more complex than a simple correlation between manual dexterity and vision.

The Fractal Nature of Haptic Space

Earlier, when considering how photography is related to the prephilosophic plane of diagrammatic features, we noted that photography would therefore by definition be of a fractal nature. What might this mean in the context of a properly haptic space?

“Fractal” is a term used to describe phenomena that are self-similar across varying scales or levels of analysis: coastlines, for instance, the length of which are always dependent upon the scale of measurement used to determine their extent. Coasts are indented by Gulfs; and these are indented by Bays; which are indented by inlets; and so on, down to a microscopic level of saturated soil. Employing ever smaller units of measure, we find any specific coastline proportionately increases in measured length.

But this does not correspond to that fractal nature found in the experience of haptic space. On a plane of immanence where diagrammatic features are defined, and on a haptic space of experiential variation, there is only a singular multiplicity. It is never a question of self-similarity across different scales and levels (a decidedly structural approach, quite characteristic of imaginary variation): instead, we are always dealing with differences that occur on a singular plane: such as, in our present case, the differences in positional variance effected by the hands and by the feet within visual consciousness.

We know that there can only be a singular plane of immanence, defined by an immanence to immanence: by definition, immanence cannot be other than itself without ceasing to be immanence; at which point, we would then be dealing with transcendence. Here, we are necessarily dealing with self-variance (as in the way each person varies from moment to moment, without becoming someone else), not a self-similarity such as that which characterizes metrical divisions of spatial extension; although in either case, we would still be dealing with diagrammatic features, as something which has been folded back on itself.

Haptic space is fractal, but not through self-similarity: haptic space is fractal through self-variance.

Consider an example drawn from a landscape void of human artifice: on mountain slopes, above the tree line and approaching low summits, one is upon ground which is noticeably and distinctly curvilinear. Visibility is limited simply because the ground curves away behind itself. The visual components of such areas are of very limited types: rocks and boulders; small shrubby trees; clumps of vegetation. However, the combinations in which this limited range of feature types can appear are virtually limitless; because, the curvature of the ground only allows a very small number of visual features to be seen at any one time.
> Figure 05-5a and 5b: Upon Curved Ground <

Since the relative horizon which occurs in this situation is not a constant but, is instead a state of constant variance, the only perspective which forms is that of survey: it is defined of the viewer by the scene being viewed. Since it is all but impossible to tell a larger rock that is seen from a greater distance from a smaller rock seen from a closer distance; since all the vegetation there varies by degree in size, but not very much by kind through species; and since all distances between visual features are relative to the viewer’s distance from them, but, the actual curvature of the ground which provides a visual horizon is indeterminate and variable: it is all but impossible to determine a specific location accurately enough (notwithstanding the use of GPS) that one could leave that spot, move about this landscape, and then return to the specified location solely by utilizing visual features as landmarks. Only relationships holding between scenes immediately viewed and those viewing them form: linkages between separately viewed scenes are all but impossible to establish due to the lack of a common, stable and shared, relativizing horizon.

This is the fractal nature of a haptic space, where positional variance on a single plane is differential in nature, not self-similar. Here, any single frame of reference has an almost limitless number of positional variations, each of which appears to be a version of that referential frame as seen from a different point of view. Only actual differences are found; although, they may seem to be directionally perspectival variations for a specific destination.

If you put something down and walk away, you may never find it again (unless it is a completely different color than everything else surrounding it). You will instead find yourself endlessly returning to the place where you think it is, without ever arriving at that specific location. Places which from any certain distance could appear to be the spot you are looking for, seemingly because their arrangement of features might match the place you are looking for when viewed from a new direction, will not be that specific place you seek; and you will find yourself constantly moving farther away from that specific place, instead of toward it. You will enter into a constant state of deterritorialization, driven by unsuccessful attempts to reterritorialize within a space where imagined similarities are in fact real differences. The ambulant haptic space you traverse will never coincide with a manual haptic space in which imagined variations of position could lead you to grasp that which you seek.

Such is the case with photography: as an art form, The Photograph may appear to have been constructed of, and for, imaging representational similarity; and as such, it may appear to be entirely determined by the mechanical consistencies of photographic imaging: but as something which is produced, every photograph is in fact defined within and by textures of very real differences. Photography may seem to produce the same thing over and over, in the form of The Photograph; but in fact, there are always very real movements of deterritorialization occurring between any two photographs.

Photography is so strongly defined by an ambulant haptic space that, even the image captures it produces can never actually grasp what it has sought, without that something becoming ‘other’: one can grasp a never ending sequence of photographs without ever having that which was photographed resting in one’s hand.

> Figure 05-5c and 5d: Fractal Space <

We can all agree that painting is a manual activity; but we must also realize that photography is an essentially ambulant activity. Painting can be defined as a haptic space wherein the actions of the hands force the eyes to trace patterns that the hands have produced; but in photography, the image can only come into being by way of actions undertaken with the feet. This is the source of those positional variances we very quickly realized are characteristic of photography: positional variance is the trace of how our feet force our eyes to function through a process of survey which is ambulant in nature.
It is precisely the lack of such a realization which has led to the exclusion of photography from the considerations of post-structural philosophers. Even Roland Barthes, one Continental philosopher who did attempt to engage photography in its own right, missed this point:

“It first of all I had to conceive, and therefore if possible express properly (even if it is a simple thing) how Photography’s Referent is not the same as the referent of other systems of representation. I call “photographic referent” not the optionally real thing to which an image or sign refers but the necessarily real thing which has been placed before the lens, without which there would be no photograph. Painting can feign reality without having seen it. Discourse combines signs which have referents, of course, but these referents can be and are most often “chimeras.” Contrary to these imitations, in Photography I can never deny that the thing has been there. There is a superimposition here: of reality and of the past.”

Roland Barthes, “Camera Lucida”; page 76.

> Figure 05-6a: Placing Objects For Photography <

In point of fact, photography is never about “the necessarily real thing that has been placed before the lens”; this is a fiction, and it is a fiction which immediately reveals its bias: that of the hand’s grasp, which picks things up and places them in the position from which they are photographed. Instead, photography is always about moving the camera into positions from which photographs are taken, and images are captured. Even when objects do seem to be placed in front of a camera, such as during studio or portrait photography, in actual fact that which is being photographed is positioned relative to the locations of light sources. The camera may still move; or it may stay stationary: but the relationship between the subject being photographed and the camera is defined by the static positions of pre-established light sources. The camera is not in a state of rest; its movement has simply been minimized.

A quick survey of photography’s history is enough to demonstrate the truth of this. Even the earliest, heaviest, most awkward cameras that used fragile glass plates as negatives were still carefully packed, carried, and briefly set up to take photographs of areas so wild that few will venture into these locations to this day. Photography has always been about orienting the camera toward the scene to be photographed, even if The Photograph is created with a different aim in mind: to place an image in the hands of another person who would never have otherwise been within that specific point-of-view where the image was captured.

The photographic process is not defined by the act of taking a photograph so much as it is by the photographer who moves between positions from which photographs are taken. This is where we find the orientations which occur through photography forming upon a prephilosophic plane of diagrammatic features; this is what tempers the demands of those diagrammatic features which photography captures. For behind every mechanical reterritorialization effected through the taking of a photograph, there is always a photographer who is potentially engaged in an ongoing process of rhizomatic deterritorialization, as he or she physically moves through space and visually assesses the photographic opportunities that form from the positional variations provided by different viewpoints.

> Figure 05-6b: Photographing Places Objectively <

“The point is that a rhizome or multiplicity never allows itself to be overcoded, never has available a supplementary dimension over and above its number of lines, that is, over and above the multiplicity of numbers attached to those lines. All multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their dimensions: we will therefore
speak of a plane of consistency of multiplicities, even though the dimensions of this “plane” increase with the number of connections that are made on it. Multiplicities are defined by the outside: by the abstract line, the line of flight or deterritorialization according to which they change in nature and connect with other multiplicities.”


> Figure 05-7a, 7b, and 7c: Positional Variance <

The dimensionality of a multiplicity is outside itself, but it is not supplemental: this is an ‘outside’ which exists only as the connectivity inherent in the multiplicity. The rhizome anchors while space is being traversed: it is anchored in space, but its connection to that space arises precisely from the fact that all space is transversal and so demands such connectivity be established out of the nature of that which defines what it is; which is simply to say, the rhizome is defined by territorially traversing space and so establishing transversality in the occurrent nature of the rhizome.

Similarly, the simple act of taking a photograph is, for a photographer, the culmination of innumerable and potentially infinite positional variations. What to include within the frame of the photograph; and, what to leave out? Which lens to use toward that end? How to choose the position which best arranges the elements of a three-dimensional scene within the two dimensional frame of a photographic composition? How to align the timing of the photograph with the event being captured? How to best capture the luminous dynamic range of the scene being imaged? Photography is an ambulant art form: it is all about moving around in space and time, in light and shadow, in order to intuitively orient the composition of diagrammatic features into an image. The Photograph doesn’t produce a representation; it anchors at a specific positional variance within the transverse nature of space, as an act of territorialization. The Photograph isn’t a copy of an object: it is an event sectioned from the transverse space of time.

> Figure 05-7d: Positional Variance Blended <

So, while it is true that we do not see in The Photograph a haptic function of properly manual production, it is also true that The Photograph emerges from a haptic space of ambulant origin:

“Classical art can be figurative, insofar as it refers to something represented, but it can also be abstract, when it extricates a geometric form from the representation. But the pictorial line in Gothic painting is completely different, as is its geometry and figure. First of all, this line is decorative; it lies at the surface, but it is a material decoration that does not outline a form. It is a geometry no longer in the service of the essential and eternal, but a geometry in the service of “problems” or “accidents,” ablation, adjunction, projection, intersection. It is thus a line that never ceases to change direction, that is broken, split, diverted, turned in on itself, coiled up, or even extended beyond its natural limits, dying away in a “disordered convulsion”: there are free marks that extend or arrest the line, acting beneath or beyond representation. It is thus a geometry or a decoration that has become vital and profound, on the condition that it is no longer organic: it elevates mechanical forces to sensible intuition, it works through violent movements. If it encounters the animal, if it becomes animalized, it is not by outlining a form, but on the contrary by imposing, though its clarity and nonorganic precision, a zone where forms become indiscernible.”

Gilles Deleuze, “The Logic of Sensation”; page 46.

http://www.rhizomes.net/issue23/index.html
Photography Paces Philosophy Pedagogic: Part 1, Text. Copyright 2012 by John Morton; LonCayeway@Yahoo.com
geometry of photography, ambulant in nature, is similarly indiscernible. It is not evident in The Photograph, for we must think its existence in order to see that it must be there. Any act of photography is always an encounter with contingencies which define its nomadic existence.

The photographic process may itself be a mechanical rather than a manual form of production; but the photographer is intuitively deploying that mechanism within an ambulant space that is haptic in nature. This is particularly true of its encounters with animality: and if the photographic capture of an animal’s image is readily apparent, the animalization which the photographer undergoes in order to take such photographs will remain indiscernible within those photographs. In such situations, the photographer even ceases to be the person they are: thinking like an animal, acting like an animal, they necessarily become something “other” than themselves, and “other” than even a ‘conceptual persona’; for any “becoming animal” is defined for the most part by the way in which one moves and acts, rather than how one thinks.

Photography is an event horizon, an act of becoming: of becoming singular photographs.

Paws For Affect

Now we are in a position where we can answer some of the vexing questions which arose earlier in our inquiry. It should be apparent to us at this point why photography always seems capable of inserting itself into the characteristically manual processes through which paintings are produced. After all, everything we do with our hands is contingent upon their having become deterritorialized paws; and that was only possible when our feet entirely took on the task of moving our bodies through physical space. In a very real sense, then, we can say that everything we do with our hands rests upon the stability of our feet.

If photography is the product of an ambulant haptic space traced through the actions of our feet, then we should expect The Photograph to always exhibit an otherwise inexplicable ability to insert itself at some point within manually defined and entirely nonrepresentational approaches to painting, regardless of the role which resemblance plays in the realization of photography’s mechanically consistent Ratios.

Indeed, “the logic of sensation” which animates Bacon’s paintings of The Figure is precisely that connectivity holding between the feet and hands, as grasped through innumerable specific variations of the orientations our bodies are capable of sustaining. It is of our finite nature as humans, as a defining human characteristic, that the forces we express through our arms and hands are grounded in our feet; and there is perhaps no better way to reveal the sensations such forces impart through our bodies than by isolating them from all grounding (including backgrounding), to portray them in raw expression. Of course, such an approach will tend to present ‘the conceptual’ in relation with such forces, as something primarily expressed and, as if exclusively realized through the arms and hands; then, the necessary grounding of ‘the conceptual’ within the ambulant might be obscured by its primarily manual occurrence; but the ambulant component will nonetheless remain, ready to and capable of asserting itself unexpectedly, at any conceptual point of insertion.

This brings us to a very interesting question that simply begs to be asked: if there is a specifically manual haptic space, and a specifically ambulant haptic space, then what is the relationship between them? It is certainly a valid question to ask; and one with which our inquiry into photography’s place within post-structural philosophy becomes utterly fascinating.

Let us consider for a moment that, somewhere back in our human ancestry, both our feet and our hands were once paws: the hind paws, and the fore paws. Both feet and hands have deterritorialized from being paws; and in doing so, have diverged in function from each other.
So, if we start with the fore paws (fp) and the hind paws (hp), we end up with a differential relationship of deterritorialized hands (dh) and deterritorialized feet (df). But, although the function of the paws has diverged through deterritorialization, the function of these deterritorialized paws within the context of vision has made hands and feet convergent with respect to the positional variations seen to occur within haptic space. This provides us with a very interesting situation:

“The definition of Baroque mathematics is born with Leibniz. The object of the discipline is a “new affection” of variable sizes, which is variation itself. To be sure, in a fractional number or even in an algebraic formula, variability is not considered as such, since each of the terms has or must have a particular value. The same no longer holds either for the irrational number and corresponding serial calculus, or for the differential quotient and differential calculus, in which variation becomes presently infinite. The irrational number is the common limit of two convergent series, one of which has no maximum and the other no minimum. The differential quotient is the common limit of the relation between two quantities that are vanishing. But we can remark that in both cases the presence of a curved element acts as a cause.”

Gilles Deleuze, “The Fold”; page 17.

These deterritorialized paws have simultaneously moved away from each other, and moved toward each other; so the positional variations they effect of haptic space are, in effect, being folded onto themselves by this convergence within the context of vision. By definition, when such a ‘self-variance’ as that which the paws have undergone becomes a ‘turning back upon itself’ (as is occurring here in the haptic space of vision), we have the conditions under which diagrammatic features can be said to form.

These are diagrammatic features which are, by definitions drawn from calculus, both irrational and differential.

Since this haptic space is a fold which is at once divergent (as deterritorialized paws) and convergent (within the context of vision), when we begin by considering the initial relationship between paws and vision and then continue on to examine the differences that such a deterritorialization of the paws would have upon visual orientation, we end up with an implied and co-requisite variation within visual systemization: this is a relationship between variation and point-of-view which defines the conditions through which variation appears to the subject in question. In short, the evolutionary development of our hands and feet would not have occurred without a correlate evolution occurring within the visual systemization of our imaging consciousness. We can describe this development within our visual systems in terms of a ‘haptic differential’: that is, our mind’s ability to “touch” upon variation indiscernibly.

By definition, this implies that the imagination would be both differential and irrational.

With this, we have found out a little something about the “lateral irreal apparitions, correlates of an impersonal consciousness” which form within Sartre’s conception of nonthetic consciousness; and, we now have the conditions by which we can position singularities, formed of ‘changes in direction’ which define diagrammatic features through their ‘turning back upon themselves,’ upon an arc or curvature of variation that implies subjectivity, as constituted through a perspectival point-of-view.

> Figure 05-9a: An Image Turned Back On Itself <

“A needed relation exists between variation and point of view: not simply because of the variety of points of view (though, as we shall observe, such
a variety does exist), but in the first place because every point of view is a point of view on variation. The point of view is not what varies with the subject, at least in the first instance; it is, on the contrary, the condition in which an eventual subject apprehends a variation (metamorphosis), or: something = x (anamorphosis). For Leibniz, for Nietzsche, for William and Henry James, and for Whitehead as well, perspectivism amounts to a relativism, but not the relativism we take for granted. It is not a variation of truth according to the subject, but the condition in which the truth of a variation appears to the subject. This is the very idea of Baroque perspective.”


From this, we have the rudimentary requirements for forming conceptual personae; and, we found them in composing a haptic space of positional variations defined equally by the actions of the hands and the feet. Beginning with the fore and hind paws (fp), (hp); raised to the power of deterritorialization, (p>d); and ending with deterritorialized hands and feet (dh), (df): we find that the slight differentiation between fore and hind paw (f/h) becomes a divergent inversion: the hands gain ascendency over the feet (h/f), in their ability to effect visual variation.

This is a ‘change in power’ which is easily conceptualized: the hind paws, which provide power and speed in a chase or for escape, move the body through space while the fore paws primarily control any changes in direction undertaken by the animal. We can say that the hind paws provide motivation, while the fore paws effect modification. Then, much later in evolutionary history, we find a radical change occurring in this arrangement with the arrival of hominids and, later, humans.

> Figure 05-10a: Transcending Standing Sight <

The feet still move us about; but the modifications effected by our hands no longer affect the feet (except indirectly, as implied by movement toward objects we wish to grasp): instead, the modifications which the hands effect have been reterritorialized upon a world of graspable objects.

**The Consistency of The Conceptual**

This does sound perfectly logical; but for the moment, we are really just having a little fun here with our use of a pseudo-mathematical symbology; we’re just playing in a pretence, and not engaging in any actual mathematics or symbolic logic: we are in essence playing with what Sartre referred to as “an imaging symbolic system that has for its correlate an irreal object - absurd phrase, pun, inopportune appearance.” After all, we have already established that what we are dealing with here is not metrical in nature; it is instead defined by difference-in-kind. So none of the symbols we are mixing about here actually correspond to a representation of anything we are talking about; instead, they are simply functioning as diagrammatic features, and making self-variances visible for us so that we can conceptualize the nature of what it is we are talking about.

We would have to be at the edge of madness (if only for a moment) to think that our juggling of the letters ‘f’, ‘h’, ‘p’, and ‘d’ actually establishes the certainty of any logical proof.

Leibniz, on the other hand, took his mathematics very seriously:

“In truth, Leibniz never fails to specify that the relation of the inconspicuous perceptions to conscious perception does not go from part to whole, but from the ordinary to what is notable or remarkable. “There are countless inconspicuous perceptions, which do not stand out enough for one to be aware of or to remember them.” We have to understand literally - that is, mathematically - that a conscious perception is produced when at least
two heterogenous parts enter into a differential relation that determines a singularity.”

“For example, the color green: yellow and blue can be perceived, but if their perception vanishes by dint of progressive diminution, they enter into a differential relation (db/dy) that determines green.”

“All consciousness is a matter of threshold. In each case we would probably have to state why the threshold is marked where it is. Yet if we take thresholds to be so many minimal units of consciousness, tiny perceptions are in each instance smaller than the virtual minimum and, in this sense, are infinitely small. The ones selected in each order are those engaged in differential relations, and hence they produce the quality that issues forth at the given threshold of consciousness (for example, the color green). Inconspicuous perceptions are thus not parts of conscious perception, but requisites or genetic elements, “Differentials of consciousness.”


Of course, if we had been serious about employing some form of calculus that describes the differential relationship within vision which holds between those positional variances effected by the hands and by the feet, we would have found ourselves using a different form of calculus than that used by Leibniz to describe the relationship of self-variance holding between what is in effect nonthetic and synthetic consciousness. The differential relationship between ambulant and haptic features might well be sufficient to singularize irrationalities at the horizon of consciousness, but, it would not of itself constitute the modifications of positional variance which constitute thought.

We would have noted how manual and ambulant haptic functions are a divergence of self-variance; and that, being folded into the diagrammatic features of vision, they define singularities. We would have placed those singularities upon an arc, a contour, an extension of ‘in betweens’ upon a plane of immanence which necessarily implies “A LIFE”; and we could even have demonstrated how such an arc implies a threshold of consciousness, where point-of-view defines subjectivity, as singularities shift minute perceptions into conscious perceptions: but we would have been unable to determine any direct correspondence between these two instances of consciousness, the positionally visual and the conceptually apparent.

We would not be able to pass directly from diagrammatic features to intensive ordinates: we would need a logic of sensation, an ordering of intensive features to do this.

We would need conceptual personae to effect the creation of concepts; and from the nature of concepts, we can intuit something of that which such production entails:

> Figure 05-11a: Across The Ages <

“Readers may start from whatever examples they like. We believe that they will reach the same conclusion about the nature of the concept or the concept of concept. First, every concept relates back to other concepts, not only in its history but in its becoming or its present connections. Every concept has components that may, in turn, be grasped as concepts (so that the Other Person has the face among its components, but the Face will itself be considered as a concept with its own components). Concepts, therefore, extend to infinity and, being created, are never created from nothing. Second, what is distinctive about the concept is that it renders components inseparable within itself. Components, or what defines the consistency of the concept, its endoconsistency, are distinct, heterogenous, and yet not separable. The point is that each partially
overlaps, has a zone of neighborhood [zone de voisinage], or a threshold of indiscernibility, with another one. For example, in the concept of the other person, the possible world does not exist outside the face that expresses it, although it is distinguished from it as expressed and expression; and the face in turn is the vicinity of the words for which it is already the megaphone.”

“These zones, thresholds, or becomings, this inseparability, define the internal consistency of the concept. But the concept also has an exoconsistency with other concepts, when their respective creation implies the construction of a bridge on the same plane. Zones and bridges are the joints of the concept.

“Third, each concept will therefore be considered as the point of coincidence, condensation, or accumulation of its own components. The conceptual point constantly traverses its components, rising and falling within them. In this sense, each component is an intensive feature, an intensive ordinate [ordonnee intensive] which must be understood not as general or particular but as a pure and simple singularity - “a” possible world, “a” face, “some” words - that is particularized or generalized depending on whether it is given variable values or a constant function... In the concept there are only ordinate relationships, not relationships of comprehension or extension, and the concept’s components are neither constants nor variables but pure and simple variations ordered according to their neighborhood. They are processual, modular. The concept of a bird is found not in its genus or species but in the composition of its postures, colors, and songs: something indiscernible that is not so much synesthetic as syneidetic. A concept is a heterogenesis - that is to say, an ordering of its components by zones of neighborhood. It is ordinal, an intension present in all the features that make it up. The concept is in a state of survey [survol] in relation to its components, endlessly traversing them according to an order without distance.”

“The concept speaks the event, not the essence or the thing - pure Event, a heccity, an entity: the event of the Other or of the face (when, in turn, the face is taken as a concept). It is like the bird as event. The concept is defined by the inseparability of a finite number of heterogenous components traversed by a point of absolute survey at infinite speed.”


> Figure 05-12a: The Implication of Infinity <

The first thing we should notice here is the nature of the relationship holding between concepts and their components, which are also concepts. This is obviously a fractal relationship but, again, it is one of self-variance and as such it defines difference-in-kind: this is a relationship defined by temporality. Earlier, we noted the same form of internal relationship with reference to photography, whereby seemingly singular photographs exhibited those internal elements identified by Barthes as punctum: again, difference-in-kind was distinguished as a singular characteristic which defines photography in a way that is entirely distinct from processes of measurement.

It is quite easy to find examples of fractal space which are defined through self-similarity: as noted earlier, it is a characteristic of such space that its measure can be defined by its parts, with the scale of the measuring unit being directly proportionate to the final, overall measure of the space’s extension.

To find a similarly succinct expression for the nature of fractal self-variance, we can start by noting a very important point within the above quotation from Deleuze and Guattari: at no point is there postulated any necessary and logical
connection between endoconsistency and exoconsistency. Those linkages which do form through the conceptual, between the endoconsistent and the exoconsistent, are produced empirically and are thus entirely contingent upon experience.

The relationship of consistency which extends throughout a concept does not connect a semiological similarity of component fusion with a corresponding similarity of external linkage: it connects a consistency of internal composition with a consistency of external variance in connectivity. We are dealing with, in effect, a consistency of non-relation; and this is fundamental for that ability of the conceptual to grasp consistency from the chaotic. This is also the nature of that sense of co-adaptation which makes the production of concepts a matter of ‘taste’: this is where the production of the conceptual can be defined in terms of grammatological tendency, rather than the determined necessities of signification. From this, we can immediately see why processes of territorialization have come to figure so prominently in the geophilosophic constructs of Deleuze and Guattari; and it is precisely because of the contingent and empirical nature of the concept in its production. The nature of this contingency is such that there must necessarily be some productive mechanism through which concepts are created; and through this, we find the productive ‘insistence’ implicated by the occurrence of conceptual personae.

Now, the insights we gathered from Sartre and Leibniz concerning the productive nature of consciousness begin to figure prominently for us; for, among the many uses to which fractal equations can be put, one finds that they are particularly well suited for describing thresholds of phase transition: from solid, to liquid, to gas, to plasma; and even the threshold of consciousness itself. This immediately suggests that the very indistinct, or indiscernible, threshold between perception and consciousness is inherently fractal in nature, and is differential in such a way as to always vary from itself: exhibiting, in a word, self-variance.

In describing this, we could also fall back upon that older mathematical fiction of calculus: for, concepts are also singularities; and it is the singular, according to Leibniz, which effects the transition between what Sartre would call nonthetic and synthetic consciousness. This is not to suggest that the distinction between perception and consciousness corresponds to that holding between nonthetic and synthetic consciousness: for, the actual nature of any such relationship would necessarily need to be determined through both clinical studies of human neurology and anthropological studies of our species’ archaeological record. In the final analysis, we would invariably be dealing with neurological functions here; and we would probably find ourselves contextualizing such functions in terms of fractal self-variances that are singular in their productive nature: but, such considerations are a little too far off-topic for us to pursue at this point in our analysis, as they would tend toward an inquiry into how consciousness-of-self evolved in the first place.

But in any case, we must suspect that concepts are formed as and/or at the threshold of consciousness: as noted throughout our inquiry, concepts must be created by conceptual personae, and these are necessarily circumscribed by contours which implicate the threshold of consciousness itself. It is important to reiterate, though, how necessary it is to conceptualize this ‘threshold of consciousness’ in terms of territorialization; for, Deleuze is always an empiricist in his philosophic constructs and it is through territorialization that The Earth upon which we dwell and within which we are immersed continues to assert the primacy of its role in determining how and what we think. As Deleuze and Guattari note:

“The plane of immanence has two facets as Thought and as Nature, as Nous and as Physis. This is why there are always many infinite movements caught within each other, each folded into others, so that the return of one instantaneously relaunches
another in such a way that the plane of immanence is ceaselessly being woven, like a gigantic shuttle. To turn toward does not imply merely to turn away but to confront, to lose one’s way, to move aside. Even the negative produces infinite movements: falling into error as much as avoiding the false, allowing oneself to be dominated by passions as much as overcoming them. Diverse movements of the infinite are so mixed in with each other that, far from breaking up the One-All of the plane of immanence, they constitute its variable curvature, its concavities and convexities, its fractal nature as it were. It is this fractal nature that makes the planomenon an infinite that is always different from any surface or volume determinable as a concept.”


> Figure 05-14a: Seasonal Cyclicity <

Since concepts are never created from nothing, we should pay attention to the fact that their singular nature is defined by components grasped in an endoconsistency, and by an exoconsistency establishing ‘bridges’ to other concepts on the same productive plane. Thus, in determining what might be described as the ‘threshold of consciousness,’ we are really only grasping some hint concerning the parameters which might best describe the nature of that “envelope” or those ‘grouping patterns’ into which visual consciousness places that which it surveys.

This is where we can be certain that we are encountering a grammatological model of analysis, rather than a semiological model grounded in representational signification: here, we are dealing with a ‘making appear’ which is inherently positional in nature.

Whatever it is of which concepts are made, it seems to have the same essential characteristics as that haptic space we found to be the folded differential of ambulant and manual haptic functions. Concepts may need to be created by conceptual personae, but they are definitely being formed from diagrammatic features upon a plane of immanence.

Drawing Conclusions

The conclusions we can draw here, although simply suggested, are nonetheless unavoidable: the exoconsistency of the concept derives from ambulant haptic space; the endoconsistency of the concept derives from manual haptic space; the concept itself is a fractal relationship of self-variance holding in singularities which form between the two; and, this self-variance is co-defined or ‘enveloped’ by a differential of vision, which places it in the context of imaging (or with reference to Sartre, defines it in terms of an imaging consciousness: the imagination).

Perhaps it is a distinguishing characteristic of painting that the diagrammatic features it produces are particularly well suited toward the production of concepts, by grasping the singular arrangement or fusion of their internal components; but, it would be equally true that the diagrammatic features which characterize photography would be particularly well suited toward composing the exoconsistent linkages that connect any concept with others. This would appear to be a very specific form of functionality which is inherent in any concept; and as we noted earlier, such forms of functionality are also found to occur as the a-signifying, anasemantic principles which define grammatology. We don’t create concepts by shifting around the arrangements of such functionalities; but we do produce situations from which concepts are produced.

Further, we can state that this differential relationship is characteristically human and typifies the spontaneity of consciousness; and, to the extent that it is implicated in the production of concepts, this localizes for us that very human nature of what Deleuze and Guattari call conceptual personae.
However, the nature of this differential relationship occurs before any concepts are actually formed; so, what we have defined here is the first place the prephilosophic nature of that plane of immanence upon which diagrammatic features form as orientations, and, as all manner of differential variances.

Insofar as we can consider consistency to be a fundamental characteristic of ‘the conceptual’; and in that the threshold of consciousness can best be described as a horizon of event, we can therefore say that conceptual personae occur as consistent contours of event horizons in consciousness; and it is through establishing singularities, as diagrammatic features, that the inclusive arcs of such event horizons are determined.

There is, however, one nagging inconsistency that attends to our analysis at this point: the definition we have been using for imaging consciousness articulates upon an apparent disjunction, well documented by Sartre, between visual perception and the imagination. Deleuze and Guattari further explored this distinction in the course of their text “What Is Philosophy?”; and in doing so, established that the arts can be characterized in terms of component “percepts,” while philosophy deals with “concepts.”

This in itself causes no inconsistencies in our analysis; but Deleuze and Guattari further postulate that the sciences are distinguished by the nature of a third basic component, which is the “functive.” Throughout our analysis, we have been considering the functional nature of those components that we have been working with; and this makes perfect sense, since one goal of post-structuralism has been to determine the nature of a properly scientific approach to linguistics which would define the field of grammatology. Our difficulty thus arises in reconciling the use of a scientific approach with a philosophic project: because we must now determine how the ‘functives’ of a scientific analysis can be reconciled with the imagination which results from imaging consciousness.

Unexpectedly, our analysis of a properly post-structural place for photography within philosophy has furnished us with an answer: we have uncovered a concept which corresponds to the functives of science, much as the percepts of art correspond to the concepts of philosophy. This ‘new’ (or, unrealized) concept can be derived from our analysis of a properly ambulant haptic space; and we can call it “the motive.”

If percepts and concepts can be said to constitute the nature of imaging consciousness, then what can we say of a consciousness which forms of ‘motives’ and ‘functives’? Simply this: that here, we are dealing with what is, in evolutionary terms, a form of consciousness that is much more archaic than imaging consciousness: here we have what can only be called a “tool consciousness.”

Is there a corresponding disjunction within this postulated ‘tool consciousness’ which corresponds to that which holds between the percepts of vision and the concepts of the imagination? Indeed there is, and it is simply this: with any basic tool created within the most distant depths of our archaic ancestry, there are two mutually exclusive but necessarily co-joined parts: a handle which facilitates grasping the tool, and the functional end that defines the tool’s use. The facility of the tool is clearly defined through the motile grasp powering its functional employment; and yet, the function of the tool is obviously why its use is motivated. These two concepts are tastefully co-adapted to each other.

> Figure 05-15a: Grasping a Tool <

It is a fact beyond disputation that the archaeological record of our human evolution clearly shows the development of this tool consciousness millions of years before any evidence of an imaging consciousness can be found; and thus we must suspect that any relationship between percepts and concepts would have to be grounded in the de facto connection already existing between motives and functives. Clearly, there is a very good reason why the
threshold of consciousness cannot be determined exclusively from any ‘calculus’ or ‘fractal equation’ which describes the integral relationships of imaging consciousness: simply, the constitution of our consciousness in terms of motivation and modification does not necessarily entail the use of an imagination. Conceptual personae do not form without imaging consciousness, but the threshold of consciousness is not necessarily defined by the imagination.

The ‘insistence’ which defines the productive nature of conceptual personae is not imaginary: it is facilitative, and it is intimately entwined with the functional nature of their creative endeavours. However, it is important to realize here that what we would call a tool consciousness appears to have evolved long before any indication of what would be a rudimentary consciousness-of-consciousness emerged; so what we are considering here as a form of consciousness is far more basic than what we now take that term to indicate, namely, consciousness-of-self. Indeed, there is reason to suspect that what we have been calling ‘the fractal nature of consciousness’ only emerged when consciousness became folded onto itself in such a way as to be capable of producing and sustaining consciousness-of-self (which implies the evolution of volitional memory). Conceptual personae can form only when consciousness has become capable of modifying itself (irregardless of whether it has acquired the habit of saying “I”); and at this point, that which motivates consciousness can become consciously facilitative in nature.

> Figure 05-16a: The Littlest Hominid <

Such speculation can carry us off in myriad directions, but, one insight we can glean here is of particular importance to us: when we are dealing with the functional nature of those concepts we have encountered in the course of our analysis, there is always a corresponding facilitative aspect through which we must grasp such functionality before we can put it to use. This is the grammatological aspect necessarily inherent within our analysis: this is what has enabled us to ‘switch about’ the concepts we have been employing, seeking new applications and fresh insights into a post-structural determination of photography’s nature.

And of course, this facilitative question regarding inherently grammatological ‘motives’ has been an unrealized concern of our inquiry right from the very beginning: because this is a form of analytic distinction which underlies our opening quotation. “The concept,” as it occurs within “the three ages of the concept,” is distinguished by the motives which define “the encyclopedia, pedagogy, and commercial professional training”: a religious proclivity toward infinite knowledge; an inclination toward teaching; and a desire for profit.

It now becomes apparent that our encounter with the concept of ‘motives’ has not uncovered something previously overlooked by post-structural philosophy; and in fact, what we are now addressing has been given a considerable amount of attention by way of analyses directed toward formations of power and knowledge. In that context, we can make a direct connection between diagrammatic features in the form of the strata that Deleuze and Guattari analyze at length, and grammatological principles that Foucault incisively analyses in the form of linguistic strategies. This observation in turn provides us with the insight we need in order to begin extracting grammatological principles from a post-structural conception of photography, much as Deleuze sought to derive the same from painting through his encounter with the works of Francis Bacon.

In seeking such unrealized grammatological principles, we should start by considering that they would be functioning nonthetically; that they can be localized through singularities which occur upon their horizons of event; that they will be characterized by a ‘before’ and ‘after’ of their occurrence; that their localization will proceed through the establishment of diagrammatic features; and, that in the specific case of photography, The Photograph’s punctum will, in functioning as a diagrammatic feature, create a ‘blind field’ that facilitatively stabilizes such grammatological principles as attend the production of the conceptual personae which create conceptual structures.
Thus while it is true to say that photography does not produce concepts in and of itself, photographs are nonetheless capable of being integral to the production of concepts. To do so, however, they need to form the ‘in between’ arc of an event horizon, upon which conceptual personae can take shape. A single photograph, distinguished through the occurrence of a photographic *punctum*, can do so; but multiple photographs are much more capable of achieving this, in creating a stabilized ambulant haptic space which compositionally integrates with the kind of manual haptic space that is most directly related to the production of conceptual structures.

Necessarily, any grammatological principle derived from photography will function through partiality (as does that which Sartre described as “a partial system that...is a case of an imaging symbolic system” which produces “lateral irreal apparitions, correlates of an impersonal consciousness”): it will be partial, in the sense of a component or an ‘in between’ but also in the sense of a ‘tending toward’ or an orientation (of survey).

One such grammatological principle, derived from photography, has been employed as the basic structural principle of this text: a series of quotations connected by commentary, as the orientations of individual photographs are connected through the ambulant arc of a photographer traversing the physical space of territory in order to capture select images from within that space. This is the rhizomatic model exemplified: an ongoing, shifting transition defined through singular points momentarily established within a nomadic course of survey. Not surprisingly, in the course of our analysis we found that the best way to proceed was by disengaging from the semiological model of signification employed by Husserl through his methodology of imaginary variation, and by instead embracing the type of grammatological model pioneered by Derrida; through which, we could explore the kind of positional variance we needed to define in order to arrive at a post-structural concept for photography.

If this oscillation between quotations and commentary is closer to the ambulant haptic space of photography than it is to a step-by-step process of walking, then we are already moving toward the conceptual here: we are already involved in the laying out of a prephilosophical plane from which concepts can emerge.

We should note, though, that such a linear discourse arrayed through the connective constraints of a phonetic writing system does not adequately capture the properly fractal nature of photography; for this, a more variably connective systemization capable of directly supporting meta-narratives would be required.

> Figure 05-17a: Positional Variance Composited <

Such systemizations are inherently a-signifying, and are best defined in grammatological terms of their compositional functionalities. Perhaps this is the fundamental reason for photography’s conceptual exclusion from post-structural philosophy: from our current historical position within linear systems of phonetic writing, we would have to look very far into the past or somewhat less far into the future to find examples outside of this linear ‘in between’ we are at present culturally immersed within.

In closing, we can note a certain irony to the fact that it was the very nature of those mechanical consistencies which define photography that most directly led to its exclusion from post-structural philosophy; because, it was these same consistencies which provided us with the opportunity to better understand the positional variances which determine a properly ambulant space; and in this way, to better understand how concepts are produced by conceptual personae.

The photographer attends to the production of the photograph; and relative to the photograph, the photographer persists as a ‘lateral irreal spontaneity,’ with little more embodiment than an apparition: as such, the photographer is an impersonal transcendental field.
photograph is not a concept, and so the photographer is not a conceptual persona.

Photographers embody positional variance; and this places photography adjunct to the formation of conceptual personae. Photographs are not concepts, but, they can certainly be utilized in the production of concepts by conceptual personae. We have seen that there is a direct relationship between the positional variances that define photography and the diagrammatic features which localize the plane of immanence; and that it is through such a localization of immanence that conceptual personae produce concepts. Thus we can say that it is the inherently ambulant nature of photography which determines its place within post-structural philosophy; and that this place is facilitative in nature.

In terms of ‘motivation,’ photography allows us to more clearly conceive of that connectivity which characterizes the organic mechanisms inherent within desire-as-production: as the ‘nonthetic’ processes of consciousness. Directly implicated in the creation of social constructs, and intimately defined by the “in betweens” which trace the edges of assemblage where composition occurs, such connectivity plays a fundamental role in the philosophic works of Deleuze and Guattari, from Anti-Oedipus onward. By determining the position which best defines the nature of photography within the field of post-structural philosophy, we inevitably find ourselves being carried back to the very roots of post-structuralism.

From this position, we can now see more clearly the nature of the problem which Barthes and Deleuze noted of modern photographic imagery: simply, in being mass produced for commercial interests, The Photograph has been given an almost infinite positionality without any change occurring in what should be its naturally corresponding degree of variance. We might see the same photograph over and over in countless different places; but despite these shifts in position, it will still appear as exactly the same photograph, with no discernible perspectival variances such as would necessarily be the case for any other object which we might see occurring in different places.

Certainly, this specifically commercial use of The Photograph is meant to be motivational in its employ; and it is predicated upon the same sense of continuity which grounds that consistency we have seen to be so essential to the formation of ‘the conceptual’:

> Figure 05-18a and 18b: HDR and Panoramas 1

“Continuity is made up no less of distances between points of view than of the length of an infinity of corresponding curves. Perspectivism is clearly a pluralism, but it thus implies by its name distance and not discontinuity (certainly no void is given between two points of view). Leibniz can define extension (extensio) as “continuous repetition” of the situs or position - that is, of point of view: not that extension is therefore the attribute of point of view, but that the attribute of space (spatium), an order of distances between points of view, is what makes repetition possible.”


> Figure 05-18c and 18d: HDR and Panoramas 2

Here, we would almost need to say that the common points found between singular instances have displaced difference: the arc of ambulant variance which defines the singular nature of ‘A LIFE’ has been rendered as a commonality and stripped of any inherent value it may have had in and of itself; instead, the endless repetitions of Commercial Advertising assumes for itself that singular nature so characteristic of the diagrammatic feature in defining how ‘the conceptual’ emerges into, and as, consciousness.

This being the case, it is no wonder that Deleuze was so dismissive of photography!
Through its use in advertising, for motivational purposes, The Commercial Photograph has been alienated from ‘the conceptual,’ by being stripped of its haptic function as a differential. Oddly, this seems to be the same fate which Deleuze and Guattari warn faces philosophy: a very basic degeneration in our understanding of the conceptual; so, in considering the place photography should have within post-structural philosophy, we might well be examining effective strategies for maintaining philosophy as a distinct discipline in its own right.

However, this would also be a heavily and minutely nuanced approach to philosophic discourse. As we have seen, the subtle influences of positional variance which are discernible within photography are not easily described or conceptualized; and this is to be expected since, such differential elements are pre-conceptual in nature. Yet, we have also seen how philosophically productive such variations in any analysis of the conceptual can be: in shifting away from the ‘universal now’ which grounded Husserl’s phenomenological technique of ‘imaginary variation,’ Derrida discovered how the deconstruction of conceptual structures was predicated upon the very differential elements which Husserl excluded in the course of his analyses.

Similarly, once we cease to see The Photograph as a static image, and instead begin to conceptualize it in terms of the ‘before’ and ‘after’ which attends any event that defines a difference-in-kind, then we can start to open up hitherto unexplored approaches to facilitating the creation of new concepts.

Of course, such an approach would never be an easy one; and it would demand the utmost of philosophic rigour, in order to yield a requisite consistency of results; but, such an approach might well offer entirely new and unexpected insights that could stand to change how we speak of what philosophy is, in what it does. Here, we might hope to discover new philosophic positions from which concepts could be created: positional variations that would be determined grammatologically, as the very grounds upon which philosophy forms its discourses.

As Barthes concluded:

>Figure 05-19a: The Ambulant Speed of Thought<

“Ultimately, Photography is subversive not when it frightens, repels, or even stigmatizes, but when it is pensive, when it thinks.”

Roland Barthes, “Camera Lucida”; page 38.
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